Before Ambassador Kristie Kenney clarified the US position on the GRP-MILF (Government of the Republic of the Philippines-Moro Islamic Liberation Front) peace process, I was asked about American involvement in our efforts to bring peace to Mindanao. To shed some light, let me humbly offer a simple narrative of selected events that took place in Washington, D.C., years ago.

As the Philippine envoy to the United States, one of my primary tasks was to strengthen bilateral relations between Manila and Washington. Indeed, the agenda was broad but the priorities?counterterrorism, defense, economic ties and national development?were dictated by immediate circumstances. Naturally, the situation in Mindanao was a common concern. By then, following 9/11, the Philippines and the United States had already begun to deepen their counterterrorism cooperation.

Our Embassy, in pursuit of this overall goal, directly proposed to the US national security adviser, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, a program of GRP-US initiatives composed of three parts:

(1) Closer cooperation to neutralize the Abu Sayyaf;

(2) Strengthening the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) reform program; and

(3) Supporting a peace process with the MILF. When this demarche was made, the Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo administration had reversed the ?all-out war? stance of its predecessor and was trying to bring the MILF to the table. Rice?s positive response to our presentation was vital to winning White House support for our efforts to pursue each of these initiatives.

A few months later, the Embassy noted that Manila had agreed to have Kuala Lumpur as the lead facilitator in the MILF talks. The MILF leader then, Hashim Salamat, had taken a clear stance condemning terrorism, including the 9/11 attacks, which meant that the United States would be able to directly support the GRP-MILF peace process.

Upon learning of this, we immediately seized the moment to approach key members of the US Congress with the end-view of obtaining assistance for what the GRP was doing in the war on terror to stabilize the region.

In crafting the recommended cooperation to support the GRP-MILF peace process, we were guided by our experience with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). After the GRP-MNLF peace was brokered by Indonesia and the Organization of Islamic Conference, the United States waded in with assistance for the reintegration of MNLF members and for the opening of more livelihood opportunities in conflict-affected areas. The assistance, carried out by USAID, made for a successful GRP-US cooperation and provided a good example of what to do with the MILF.

The first member of US Congress whose help we sought for this funding assistance was Rep. Todd Tiahrt (R). He is one of the founders of our 85-member Philippine Friendship Caucus in the US House of Representatives, the first ever to be formed in Capitol Hill for the Philippines. From Wichita Kansas, Congressman Tiahrt is a great friend with whom we coordinated for the rescue of kidnapped Gracia Burnham and her late husband, Martin. The congressman was aware of a hostage substitution proposal which was not approved by the authorities.

We spoke to Representative Tiahrt about an assistance package (initially for livelihood, basic services and reintegration of the MILF rebels into the mainstream) in the order of $30-$50 million. We added that, should these offers of American assistance be rejected, the funds could be redirected to reinforce the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Clearly, however, concluding a peace process would be a definite gain in the war on terror.

Our proposal could not have been better timed because the White House needed funds for the US engagement in Iraq. Consequently, Capitol Hill was rushing a supplemental budget bill which included a foreign assistance provision. We had to move fast.

On the day following our visit with Representative Tiahrt, his chief of staff called to say that the congressman had taken the floor to declare that the Philippine Embassy had presented a request of utmost importance, which quickly led to its being voted upon and approved.

We then hastened to approach the US Senate, particularly Senators Daniel Inouye and Ted Stevens, both invaluable supporters of the Philippines. Like the members of our Caucus, our Senate allies were convinced of the importance of helping Philippines in its efforts to promote peace and to strengthen our national defenses. Without delay, our many friends in the Senate likewise passed the supplemental budget bill with the Philippine provision.

As a final step, we needed to seek the approval of the US Executive and headed for the Department of State, not realizing that what awaited us was a strong negative response. A high official of the department was most emphatic: We should not be interfering with a supplemental bill of President Bush. We were told to abandon the initiative.

Rather than be stymied, we recited many Hail Mary?s, and proceeded to revisit Rice?s office to seek endorsement of our initiative that was consistent with our strategy in Mindanao as previously presented.

A few days later, the supplemental bill to fund the invasion in Iraq was passed. With the backing of the National Security Council, the bill carried a singular earmark for $30 million in foreign assistance for the GRP-MILF peace process. (The following year, this was followed with an additional funding for the same purpose.)

As a result of this foreign assistance, USAID and the US Institute for Peace were tasked to support the programs. Over time, because the GRP-MILF peace process remained elusive, a considerable amount of the approved funds were channeled to complete the development assistance programs for the Moro National Liberation Front.