From the top

THE CURRENT congressional inquiries on the controversial plea bargain entered into by disgraced military comptroller Carlos F. Garcia with the Office of the Ombudsman have been questioned by some critics for being long on politics and short on legislation. The investigations may have opened a Pandora’s box of disgusting revelations—the practice of providing multimillion-peso going-away presents for the outgoing Armed Forces chiefs of staff during the previous administration, the apparent complicity of auditors and anti-graft prosecutors who are constitutionally mandated to provide checks and balances to military and official corruption—and they will surely go a long way in determining how deep-seated corruption is among the top brass and how military men holding critical positions could wield influence that equals if not exceeds that of his superiors. But it remains to be seen whether the inquiries will ultimately reform the military, whether it will go beyond the realm of political theatrics, and whether it will have an effect beyond the paltry impact of newspaper headlines that are here today, gone tomorrow.  What the people want to know is whether the lessons that have been learned from the sordid episode will lead to lasting reforms through legislation. After all, congressional investigations are supposedly conducted in aid of legislation.

Providing legislative direction toward a reformed AFP is House Bill No. 6 prescribing a fixed term of three years for the AFP chief of staff. Authored by Muntinlupa Rep. Rodolfo Biazon, the bill says a fixed term of three years will allow the chief of staff  “adequate time to plan, test and execute matters to best achieve a desired  end.” In his explanatory note, Biazon laments that while the term of the chief of staff is limited by the Constitution to three years, it “is even shortened by compulsory retirement laws.” “Such a situation,” he adds, “delimits the President’s choices to fill vacancies with senior officers whose dates of retirement draw near and provides the perception of the President’s action as being politically driven.”  Since the AFP chief of staff is “critical to the country’s interest,” Biazon says, “it is perhaps only proper that the persons chosen to serve in such a capacity be the best qualified and, not necessarily among the most senior, and should be able to enjoy a period of service that will allow him/her to implement programs and policies and thus deliver on the objectives of the AFP.”

The relevance of the proposed law to the furor over Garcia’s plea bargain is easy to see. The quick succession of chiefs of staff under the previous administration was made possible by compulsory retirement laws which provided a legal fig leaf to the appointing power’s self-serving design to ingratiate herself  to the military establishment, enabling each of the military top brass to sit for a short time as head. In the process, the administration built itself a base in the military that solidified its hold on power. The result was the worst politicization of the military since Ferdinand Marcos’ martial law as well as the further corruption of the AFP.

With the chief of staff’s term fixed for three years, the position will be insulated from politics, and the sitting president can conduct a professional search for qualified candidates. Of course, the position will not be 100 percent immune from politics: Biazon’s measure, along with its Senate counterpart filed by Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, allows the president to fire the chief of staff for loss of confidence. But a president making a critical appointment to a powerful position whose term is fixed by law to practically half of a chief executive’s elective term would think twice—and very hard—before making an appointment. Definitely he would have to consider factors other than base political ends or expediency in making the appointment. He would try to make an intelligent and responsible choice.

Another reform measure that merits serious study is legislation barring the appointment of military retirees to civilian positions for a number of years. Former administrations have dangled such rewards to buy the loyalty of military officers, again contributing to the politicization of the military while watering down a key pillar of constitutional republicanism: civilian authority over the military. The result was the militarization of the bureaucracy. The way to military reforms is clear: The government must establish a thoroughly professional officers’ corps.