Why was Janet Lim-Napoles acquitted?

Why indeed was Napoles (and several others) freed of criminal responsibility for her alleged 16 separate violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) resulting in the illegal siphoning of pork barrel funds to private pockets, a horrible scam exposed by the Inquirer in 2013 and carried later by all media outlets?

TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION, I read the 223-page decision of the Sandiganbayan (People v. Revilla, May 22, 2023) penned by Justice Geraldine Faith A. Econg (not by Presiding Justice Amparo Cabotaje-Tang as erroneously reported by the Inquirer on May 23 and sadly repeated in its editorial on May 26) with the concurrence of Justices Efren N. de la Cruz (Division chairperson) and Arthur O. Malabaguio.

To understand the decision, I think a backgrounder on the crimes of plunder and of graft is essential. Compared with murder, robbery, malversation, and other crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code (which took effect on, believe it or not, Jan. 1, 1932) and with graft punishable by RA 3019 (which took effect on Aug. 17, 1960), plunder is a relatively new crime defined by RA 7080 (approved on July 12, 1991, and took “effect 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation”).

Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (Feb. 26, 2002) explained that the anti-plunder law (RA 7080) “was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. [It] was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal wealth … Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the overall conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare … the Anti-Plunder Law was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem.” Moreover, the law helped unclog judicial dockets.

ESSENTIALLY, THE ANTI-PLUNDER LAW PUNISHES the amassing, accumulation, or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth directly or indirectly through a series of crimes called “predicate acts,” like “malversation, bribery, and violations of RA 3019.” In other words, the “predicate acts” are the bases of the more serious crime of plunder which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

In the present case, Napoles (and her co-accused) were charged by the prosecutors of the Office of the Ombudsman (OBM), not of the Department of Justice, with 16 separate violations of Section 3-e of RA 3019 by allegedly conspiring with her co-accused and “acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality” that caused “injury to the government” and gave “unwarranted benefits and advantage to private individuals.” At the same time, the OBM also filed a separate charge of plunder against Sen. Ramon Revilla Jr. and others, including Napoles, using these very same violations of RA 3019 as the predicates.

SANDIGANBAYAN HELD THAT since the OBM prosecutors already used these 16 violations of the anti-graft law as the predicate crimes in the charge of plunder they filed to avoid the “procedural nightmare” spoken of by the Supreme Court, and since the accused led by Revilla have earlier been acquitted of plunder because of the prosecution’s failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt these very same predicate crimes, Napoles could no longer be found guilty of the said unproven predicate acts.

A major part of Justice Econg’s masterpiece patiently narrated the testimonies, especially of Benhur Luy, made during the trial which were identical to those in the plunder case. She could have shortened her decision by simply referring to and no longer reproducing these testimonies that were already sufficiently taken up in the plunder decision.

In sum, I concur with the Sandiganbayan. Despite her acquittal, Napoles remains in detention due to her other pending cases. Regardless of whether I agree or not with the earlier acquittal of Revilla, et al., I am bound by such judgment. Here, the prosecutors committed the “legal nightmare” of multiple prosecutions sought to be avoided by the anti-plunder law. Verily, the OBM prosecutors are lucky Justice Econg did not chastise them for committing this legal blunder.

I note with pride that the chairman of the Division, Justice Efren N. de la Cruz, concurred with the decision. He is known as a reliable, credible, honest, and competent jurist, and who, IMHO, should have been promoted to the Supreme Court long ago. My wish is no longer possible now because he would be reaching the compulsory retirement age next year while the next vacancy in the Court will still be in June 2025. Three of his former colleagues in the anti-graft court, Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, Diosdado M. Peralta, and Alexander G. Gesmundo had been promoted to the high court and had in fact become chief justices. Notably, he preceded CJ Gesmundo in the Sandiganbayan.

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