OFFICIALS in the Department of Justice are mistaken if they think that they were vindicated by the National Bureau of Investigation’s findings that there is not enough evidence to prove they took a dive on behalf of alleged drug dealers. The insufficiency of evidence in this particular case is not what we dispute. We believe that the too unimpressive track record of the DOJ’s prosecutorial arm, when it comes to the prosecution of accused drug dealers, merits nothing less than sustained scrutiny.
On the other hand, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency agents who put the DOJ on the spot should realize that their enthusiasm for shooting from the hip is vigilantism, and that such behavior and attitude are not just offensive, but inimical, to dispensing justice. To be sure, their frustrations and accusations have struck a chord with the public; but the public has always been wary, too, of gun-toting law enforcers.
Being “hot to trot”—that is, eagerly rounding up alleged drug dealers—coupled with a shotgun approach toward institutions that either drag their feet or bungle cases, causes more problems than it supposedly solves. Both the PDEA and the DOJ are supposed to enforce the justice system; institutional fratricide is not the antidote to the cozy and corrupt realities that hamper the apprehension and prosecution of drug dealers.
Lost in the competing headlines is the bigger picture, and that picture is the looming menace narcopolitics represents in the coming 2010 local and national elections. The dangers of narcopolitics have been in the public consciousness since the 1990s. Its corrupt and corrupting influence has been on display time and again, but the full extent of the subversion of law and order by foreign and domestic drug dealing syndicates remains a matter of conjecture.
There is no question that money counts in politics; and that our fabulously expensive political campaigns require greater and greater infusions of funds as the public becomes increasingly cynical of candidates. Which means voters who find little to believe in candidates are more and more inclined to be moved by appeals to their more mercenary instincts. At the same time, there is a growing demand for reform throughout the country, and this can only be neutralized by politicians if they engage in fraud and terrorism, both of which require lavish expenditures as well.
The global economic downturn, which officialdom has responded to by irresponsibly insisting we’re better positioned to weather the storm than other countries in the region, will take its toll on the 2010 campaign. Businessmen, already increasingly shy of bankrolling candidates, will be even less inclined to shell out money to candidate-extortionists—except those whose success depends on exchanging donations for political favors; the public, never inclined to actually shell out money to candidates, will, at the same time, demand more and more in terms of goods and services from a cash-strapped government. Which means someone has to step in to fill the coffers of ambitious candidates.
Enter the criminal syndicates. They are the drug dealers, the smugglers, the gambling lords and their goons for hire. They are, in many cases, either the same people or allied with each other. They already have officials in their pockets and can only hope to increase their network of dependents and co-criminals in the military, the police, LGUs and national government, the judiciary and the media. All of them increasingly tied to triads and mafias with foreign connections, too.
We do not doubt there are sincere, zealous combatants against the drug menace. But brushing aside the law is not the answer, whatever its limitations. Enforcers have the obligation to make apprehensions that are iron-clad; prosecutors have the duty to take on such cases and prosecute them with vigor. It is a lesson as old as the gangster Al Capone ending up in jail for the unglamorous offense of tax evasion. In law enforcement and war, attacking from the flanks is more effective than a frontal assault.