Last Friday, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo?s official day began with a mass oath-taking of local officials. It was supposed to end with a Mass, sponsored by one of her sons. But newly confirmed generals who were also supposed to take their oath were a no-show. Reporters noticed, and surely the President did, too. We can only surmise that this added to her developing sense of unease that day, which culminated in her abandoning the loyalty Mass organized by her son in favor of planting herself in the Camp Crame national police headquarters during the protest rally in Makati City.

The choice of Camp Crame serves as a reminder that in the mind of the President, her ultimate bulwark of support is the Philippine National Police (PNP). And yet it is the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) that has been representing itself, without any subtlety, as the ultimate arbiter of the balance of power in our country. When AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon engineered his own AFP-PNP ?unity walk,? he did so to send the message to both civilians and soldiers alike that the top brass was united and that they would move as one. Which, however, doesn?t necessarily mean they will move, when the time comes, unquestioningly in the President?s defense.

This brings us to the ultimate fear of the Armed Forces. It is as simple as this: They don?t want to reach the point where soldiers end up shooting one another. This fear surpasses the military and police?s traditional concern over the dilemma of whether or not to fire on the public in a people power situation.

We say this because if the officer corps has even considered a people power situation, they are doing so purely from the point of view of past military involvement, that is, as some sort of ?tipping point? that will make or break an administration?s hold on power. At present, the AFP and PNP have devoted their energies to thwarting protest actions, as well as to keeping authority within the military and police in the hands of the generals. This has only served to increase their influence, for whatever purpose they see best to use it (extracting concessions and perks from the administration, or foiling political groups they mistrust in the opposition). In forcing everyone?administration and opposition alike?to up the political ante, they are increasing their influence to determine the course of events.

This is a blatantly political play on Esperon?s part. It is a partisan strategy. First, because it maximizes his own options, including evading accountability for the issues laid at his doorstep (from partisanship in the 2004 elections to extrajudicial killings), and because it has the officer corps playing off both the administration and opposition against each other. This is different from the constitutional devotion and political neutrality expected of our officer corps.

There are many things the military and police can do to keep them out of the sphere of partisan politics but which will contribute to their performance of obligations to be not just good soldiers but good citizens, too. Several long-overdue reforms have failed to receive administration support.

The first is the need for the National Defense Act, Commonwealth Act No. 1, to be brought up to date. The second is to revisit and update the Articles of War, which also dates back to the Commonwealth, to take into consideration the development, since then, of the concept of command responsibility. This includes the manner in which military justice has recently been increasingly perverted for partisan purposes.

The third is to further strengthen professionalism by adopting a fixed term for the AFP chief of staff and the commandant of the Philippine Military Academy. The fourth is to find ways to eliminate the political pressure, often verging on outright extortion, placed by politicians on officers whose promotions are brought before the Commission on Appointments. And the fifth involves the eradication of corruption within the officer corps.

Esperon is playing Praetorian Guard who can uphold or depose emperors. There is much he can do, if he intends to retire in May, to pursue reform and accountability in the AFP. But he isn?t doing them.