It is said that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has sent word that she is quite happy with Manuel Villar Jr. remaining as Senate president. Which is different from her actually spending political or any other capital to prevent his being toppled. Edgardo Angara reportedly expressed interest in once more being Senate president, but his candidacy didn’t take off, reportedly because he didn’t seek the Palace’s intercession on his behalf. Juan Ponce Enrile, on the other hand, is reportedly keen on crowning his political career with the Senate presidency, and he has never been shy about lobbying chief executives for their support.

The Palace bloc of senators — Santiago, Gordon, Revilla, Lapid, Honasan, and quite possibly Angara, too, not to mention de facto senator Zubiri — could easily mobilize in support of Enrile, making for a sizeable administration bloc of seven votes. To reach the magic number of 13 votes, they would need to obtain the votes of the NPC party’s Legarda and Escudero, of Lacson, and the Liberal Party’s Roxas and Biazon.

This is still one vote short, but that might be provided by Enrile voting for himself or even by Madrigal, who has been tag-teaming with Lacson to demolish Villar, lest she’d be ridiculed for being half-baked in her aggression.

Aquino would probably never vote for his father’s jailer, but might, out of party loyalty, not cast a positive vote for Villar by abstaining.

Villar, for his part, seems to enjoy the support of his party mate, Cayetano and his sister and fellow senator Pia; as well as that of Estrada, Arroyo, Pimentel, and Pangilinan. Trillanes, if only he could vote, would probably be foursquare for the retention of Villar.

But since the Senate president has never been shy about voting for himself (setting aside the tradition that he shouldn’t), this means he has a bloc of seven votes. Not enough to keep the presidency of the upper house. But even if he loses the administration bloc except for Arroyo, he only needs to court two more senators to thwart any efforts to unseat him. And the most likely candidates seem to be the NPC contingent of Escudero and Legarda.

After all, if there is a kernel of truth behind the talk of an enlarged, revitalized Nacionalista Party being formed out of the reunification of the Nacionalista Party (NP) with the NPC (which began as a wing of the NP, after all), plus the Ramos-De Venecia wing of the Lakas-CMD, then it would make sense for the NPC senators to maintain the behind-the-scenes momentum of the unification talks. Villar has even reportedly submitted an application for the NP to be admitted into the international association of Christian Democratic parties, which would provide a convenient ideological pretext for the Ramos-De Venecia wing of Lakas-CMD to bolt the absorption of the party they founded by the administration’s pet party, Kampi.

Such a move would be dramatic: simultaneously reviving the political fearsomeness of Fidel Ramos and Jose de Venecia, while sowing confusion, or at least irritation, in the administration coalition, whose members would have to consider the implications of being frozen out of an emerging “Super NP.” It would also add political muscle to the already fabulously impressive financial muscle enjoyed by Villar, who could model himself as a kind of Filipino Thaksin enjoying the blessing of kingmakers Ramos and Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco.

But such a dramatic move would require a dramatic justification. What might provide such a justification? Take your pick: a move to extend the President’s term might be one; national irritation over the President’s bungled Mindanao plan might be another; or even both, combining to provide fresh fodder for yet another impeachment effort where the President’s wallet might just be blunted by the desire of every politician to ensure their political prospects beyond 2010 by finally showing some spine.

The Palace being well informed, it surely knows that while it can do business with Villar, his ambitions are focused on 2010 and that means thwarting the President and her people when it comes to Charter change. Malacañang cannot afford to risk a scenario where its iron-clad hold on the ruling coalition suddenly cracks; and in any case, it has more options if its bloc of senators helps elect a new Senate president while cutting Villar down to size.

Of course, the presidential aspirations of Lacson and Roxas would be served by toppling Villar, because it would prove that the size of Villar’s wallet—the one thing that gives him a tremendous advantage over his rivals—in the absence of charisma, cannot hold the loyalty of senators, much less the political class. It would reduce him to being a Mitra or De Venecia, cash-rich but vote-poor, just as his campaign is supposed to be gathering steam. And as part of the majority, the administration bloc could be tactically more useful in either sneaking Charter change through or at least blunting any impeachment mischief.

It would therefore make sense for Escudero and Legarda to support Villar; but that would be to ignore their own ambitions for higher office. Legarda’s presidential ambitions are doomed, if Villar becomes the chief of a Super NP, while Escudero could still aspire for the vice presidency. But if the party elders fail to form a Super NP, then it also means the NPC is left with Escudero and Legarda as its brightest stars for 2010: and Escudero surely knows his star is waxing while Legarda’s is waning. So it is in their interest to topple Villar, anyway, because in a sense their patron, Cojuangco, would need them even more.

But Villar can take a cue from his nominal ally, the Palace, and what Rigoberto Tiglao famously boasted, quoting Nietzsche when the current crisis began: “Whatever doesn’t kill us makes us stronger.”