MacArthur’s folly

Exactly 73 years ago today, Dec. 8, Japan’s imperial forces devastated US air bases in the Philippines some nine hours after the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor. With the destruction of the strategic naval base in Oahu, America totally lost the capability to assist or reinforce its forces in the Pacific.

Japan’s preemptive strike was part of a grand, desperate stratagem aimed not only at denying the Philippines as an advance base of US military operations but also at acquiring strategic resources of US, British and Dutch colonies in Asia and the Far East. If it shattered the Filipinos’ caricatured view of the Japanese as meek, buck-toothed, bespectacled creatures, it also demolished the myth of Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s brilliance as a military strategist.

Along with an army of 135,000 troops, MacArthur had 227 assorted fighters, bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. All these elements, he asserted, combined into a “tremendously strong offensive and defensive force.” A flamboyant and polarizing figure, he even boasted that the Philippines was now the “key or base point of the US defense line.”

MacArthur’s boasts beguiled both his superiors in Washington and Filipino leaders, including President Manuel L. Quezon. It was Quezon who had enlisted him upon his retirement as US Army chief of staff in 1937, as the first and only field marshal of the Philippine Army. As US Army chief, MacArthur would have noted a troubling report of US Sen. James F. Byrnes to President Roosevelt. Byrnes had visited Manila to witness Quezon’s inauguration as president of the Commonwealth on Nov. 15, 1935. A perturbed Byrnes later wrote of his sojourn to Manila and Tokyo:

“There [in Manila], Americans had expressed to us their concern over the increasing indications of Japan’s aggressive intentions… Therefore, when we stopped in Japan I made a special effort to inquire into Japanese naval appropriations and naval construction. A study of the Japanese budget for 1936 readily revealed that at least half of the total was devoted to the Army and Navy. Members of our embassy staff were convinced that the published budget disclosed only part of the naval appropriations.”

It is not known if MacArthur attached any importance to Byrnes’ concern, but the general certainly did not lack for urgent warnings about Japan’s dark intentions. Inexplicably, he maintained a business-as-usual attitude that would ultimately lead to the capitulation of more than 75,000 Usaffe troops in Bataan, the largest surrender in US and Philippine military history, to a force half its size.

The shock of Japan’s daring perfidy exposed MacArthur’s flawed military judgment. In “American Caesar,” biographer William Manchester describes MacArthur’s mental condition as verging on the “catatonic” following the carnage at Pearl Harbor. Thus his inability to heed Roosevelt’s directive to execute the Amended Rainbow Plan-5, a contingent Philippine defense posture.

Despite the nine-hour time lag between the Hawaii and Philippine incidents (due to the difference in time zones) and cabled alarms, MacArthur neglected to redeploy the Far East Air Force (FEAF) in Luzon. As a result, Japanese fliers destroyed most of the FEAF planes on the ground, including brand-new B-17 Flying Fortress bombers, “thus eliminating the last significant remnant of the Allies’ air power in the Pacific,” observes Michael Korda in his book “Ike: An American Hero.”

The destruction triggered a barrage of stinging criticisms of MacArthur in the US high command. Why did he fail to move his air assets to safety in spite of adequate notice? His refusal to consult a livid FEAF commander, Maj. Gen. Lewis Brereton, during those critical hours was incomprehensible.

To be sure, the available historical evidence about that tragic day contains gaps, contradictions and complexities that make it difficult for historians to assign guilt. But history provides corroboration of MacArthur’s poor and reckless generalship, arising mainly from grossly inefficient intelligence operations and a singular lack of sense of the enemy’s abilities.

MacArthur’s folly, which occurred before the fog of war set in, consisted of three parts. The first was his failure to arrive at a reasonable gauge of the extent of Japan’s intentions. The Mukden Incident in 1931, where Hirohito’s troops seized Manchuria in northeastern China, and the full-scale invasion of China in 1937 were symptomatic of a larger Japanese design that would later evolve as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This diabolic design was announced by Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita on June 29, 1940.

The second was his inability to anticipate the dire impact of Roosevelt’s decree on July 26, 1941, freezing all Japanese assets in the United States and imposing crippling sanctions against the export of strategic raw materials to Japan. The embargo, in retaliation for the Japanese occupation of French Indochina, merely goaded Hirohito’s cabal to stiffen.

The third was his failure to radically revise his timetable and plans when Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy on Sept. 27, 1940. This was effectively a declaration of war. As a seasoned commander, he should have been prudent enough to move up his timetable and contrive alternative strategies.

War is never fair and, in the clash of arms, justice is often a fugitive. The senior commanders at Pearl Harbor, Adm. Husband Kimmel and his Army counterpart, Lt. Gen. Walter Short, were relieved and investigated for dereliction of duty. They were denied any forewarning by Roosevelt and Army chief of staff George C. Marshall, who both had access to secret Japanese diplomatic cables that spelled Pearl Harbor’s doom.

Due to his stature and powerful political links, MacArthur—who had ample warning of Japan’s assault on the Philippines—was spared the ignominy of a formal inquiry. He was eventually promoted to General of the Armies and presented the Medal of Honor, America’s highest military award.

Rex D. Lores (rexlores@yahoo.com) is a member of the Philippine Futuristics Society.