Dutertes: The great ‘destabilizers’?

Ernest Hemingway memorably wrote in one of his novels: “How did you go bankrupt? Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.” One can say the same thing about political bankruptcy. Or, to be more accurate, political purge.

President Marcos kicked off the year with a bang. In Executive Order No. 81, originally issued on Dec. 30, 2024 but made public only recently, the Armed Forces’ commander in chief effectively purged the country’s most notorious political dynasty from the country’s most sensitive decision-making body. The move was justified based on the “need to further guarantee” that the National Security Council (NSC) “remains a resilient national security institution, capable of adapting to evolving challenges and opportunities, both domestically and internationally.” Moreover, Malacañang added that streamlining the country’s highest national security decision-making body is based on the imperative to “ensure that its council members uphold and protect national security and sovereignty, thereby fostering an environment conducive to effective governance and stability.”

In November, Vice President Sara Duterte had the temerity to demand, in a letter to National Security Adviser Eduardo Año, an explanation on why she was never invited to any core NSC meeting shortly after she openly threatened the lives of the President, the First Lady, and Speaker Martin Romualdez.

At that time, Rodrigo Duterte himself was agitating elements in the security services to make interventions to “protect the Constitution” amid the emergence of an alleged “fractured” government. The former president forgot to mention that the “fractured” part was largely of his own doing, starting with his parallel diplomatic flirtation with Beijing in defiance of the Marcos administration’s policies and, worse, open attacks on the President in early 2024.

On multiple occasions, the former president and his factotums came just short of calling for a coup d’état, while clownishly weaponizing the Edsa people power legacy by organizing pathetically sparse and poorly attended rallies. Just as troubling, of course, is the Dutertes’ suspected sympathies for Zhongnanhai, a reference to China’s central government and its leadership.

Not too long ago, Sara was the head of the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict; the officer in charge whenever Mr. Marcos was on foreign trips; the head of the most well-resourced department in the Cabinet, and, according to EO 81, part of the NSC’s executive committee. Meanwhile, her father, Rodrigo, was considered an elder statesman, a foreign policy confidant, and, crucially, part of the broader “big picture” NSC meetings, when the administration sought the wisdom and influence of former presidents.

All of a sudden, the Dutertes have found themselves outside all the relevant circles of power and sensitive national security discussions. Meanwhile, the newly constituted NSC is packed with Romualdez’s allies, underscoring the solidity of the Speaker’s position in the pecking order. This is particularly crucial, since only weeks ago, there were seemingly credible reports about a potential ceasefire between the House of Duterte and the House of Marcos at the expense of the President’s right-hand man in the legislature.

Having said that, Mr. Marcos still has a long way to go in cleaning up the house. To begin with, he lacks a competent consigliere in ways Christopher “Bong” Go was to Duterte and Ronald Liamas was to Benigno Aquino III. It also doesn’t help that the commander in chief himself lacks spontaneous communication skills and has yet to launch a proper “fireside chat” initiative to directly reach out to the Filipino people. Even worse, he has been dismissed as either a “weak leader,” “boring,” and a “party boy” by critics from across the political spectrum, underscoring the lack of fear factor, which is extremely crucial when dealing with mafioso-like opponents.

Despite the months-long quad committee hearing exposing the anomalies of the Duterte dynasty’s governance practices, the prospect of International Criminal Court warrants of arrest against the former president, and Sara’s collapsing popularity, the reality is that the Philippine political landscape remains incredibly indeterminate because there is no center of gravity.

If anything, numerous figures in the liberal-progressive opposition seem to be singularly focused on real and alleged anomalies in the Marcos administration’s new budget rather than the far more insidious threat posed by the now-exposed Dutertes. For all the incumbent’s foibles, and all the undeniable crimes of the Marcos dictatorship, one should not lose sight of the greatest threat to our constitutional order and territorial integrity.

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rheydarian@inquirer.com.ph