WPS resolution may not get enough votes

It is rare for an ambassador to invite the attention of a host government to a flaw in a foreign policy initiative. French Ambassador Michèle Boccoz did that in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) dispute when she asked: “What are the expectations of the Philippines in raising it to the United Nations (UN)?” The ambassador was referring to the proposed resolution to be submitted to UN General Assembly (UNGA) to condemn “the continued harassment of Filipino fishermen and continued incursions on the WPS by China Coast Guard vessels etc. …” The statement of Boccoz is a friendly advice. It made it easier to explain the flaws in the resolution thus: 1) The proposed resolution is dubious; 2) The repeated statements that the issue will be submitted to UNGA is disinformation; and 3) Our ignorance as to what to do next if the UNGA approves our resolution.

In multilateral diplomacy, you frame the resolution in answer to: “What benefits do I get?” Nations, like individuals, are selfish. The resolution which will satisfy this selfish motive will be to ask the UNGA to allow us full access to the resources in all the areas granted to us under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos). China has been denying us access to resources in the WPS that belongs to us. This benefit will apply to all littoral member states of the UN. It should be readily endorsed by almost all 145 littoral states. As worded, the proposed Senate resolution will only get three certain votes. China is consistently harassing Vietnam and us, at times Malaysia. A resolution along this line will not cater to the selfish motives of most nations.

The statements that our resolution should be presented to the UNGA attributed to retired Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, is disinformation. The events in the WPS are “threats to peace” and must be presented to the UN Security Council (UNSC). The UNGA can accept such complaint only if the UNSC is paralyzed by the veto. This is done under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution. The UNSC has five permanent members (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) and 10 nonpermanent members elected by the UNGA. A veto happens if one of the Big Five casts a negative vote on a substantive issue. We need a majority of nine votes, two-thirds of the UNSC members, so that in the event of a Chinese veto, we can transfer the issue to the UNGA under the Uniting for peace resolution.

However, had we presented the Senate resolution, we may not have been able to get the nine votes. If we failed to get the two-thirds majority vote in the UNSC, China does not have to veto the same. In this event, our resolution is dead; we cannot go to the UNGA. It would have been a debacle.

If we get the nine votes in the UNSC, we can invoke the Uniting for Peace resolution and present the case to the UNGA. We need a vote of 97 (majority of 193) to win in the UNGA.

This issue: “What do we do if we win in the UNGA?” is the blank spot which motivated the French ambassador to pose her question. Carpio in his response stated, “… condemnation is enough and doable.” That statement is ambiguous and indicates we do not know what to do next. In fact, this issue, “What do we want?” was the thrust of the French ambassador’s query.

Traditionally, a victory in the UNGA under the Uniting for Peace resolution is only considered a moral victory. Under the UN Charter, only the UNSC has the authority to prescribe the use of force as what happened in the Korean War and in the First Gulf War. However, in the first Afghan war caused by the Soviet invasion in 1979, the oil-rich Muslim countries formed the “coalition of the willing.” They decided to fund the Mujahideen rebels. There was an escalation later on. The coalition added “freedom fighters” which included Osama bin Laden. This made the Afghan war unwinnable for the Soviets. It withdrew its forces during the Mikhail Gorbachev reform era in 1989. Thus, we could, after winning a vote in the UNGA, form a “coalition of the willing” to help us implement the decision of the UNGA, a fact overlooked in the current discussions. We will need maritime assets, not Bin Ladens, to assert our claims in the WPS. We have to form a coalition of like-minded countries which will escort our supply vessels to Ayungin Shoal and to guard our fishermen.

The WPS dispute is now in its diplomatic phase. Carpio should let the Department of Foreign Affairs career diplomats handle this dispute from hereon.

—————-

Hermenegildo C. Cruz is a career ambassador who served in the UN from 1984-1986. He was a member of the Asean Committee which, under the Uniting for Peace resolution, successfully worked for the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces which had invaded Kampuchea (Cambodia). He is thus the only ambassador with this experience. After his tour of duty in the UN, he was transferred to Moscow.