What they’ve done right

Three Asian states — Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan — are being hailed for the actions and policies they have undertaken that appear to have successfully minimized the spread of COVID-19 in their respective territories.

Their experience with the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) epidemic in 2002 has apparently provided these countries valuable insights on handling a new health crisis.

Hong Kong, which had the most number of SARS-related deaths and infections next to China, quickly imposed protocols such as closing schools, imposing work-from-home arrangements, and tightening its borders. The use of hand sanitizers and thermal scanners were already commonplace.

The same was true for Taiwan, where temperature monitors to screen arriving travelers at airports have been in place since 2003. Taiwan was the first to ban flights from Wuhan, China, on Jan. 26, and had been screening passengers from that city since late December even before China admitted that human transmission occurred with the new coronavirus. Taipei implemented 124 safety protocols including border controls, school and work policies, hospital resource assessment, and hourly TV and radio public-service broadcasts on COVID-19.

Singapore’s transparent communication channels, exemplified by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s clear and concise video addresses, have also been cited as a key measure that helped calm the public and prevented panic. The firm and coherent hand of government was matched by an efficient monitoring system that was put in place after SARS. Singapore’s stringent contact tracking system, which gave investigation teams only a two-hour window to trace a patient’s exposure, allowed it to detect almost three times more cases than the global average. And Singapore, like Taiwan, also offered tests for free.

Which brings us to South Korea, whose experience in 2015 with the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), taught it a valuable lesson on prompt diagnosis. When MERS-CoV hit, the country’s first patient was reported to have gone from one medical facility to another, triggering hospital-to-hospital transmission.

This prompted authorities to institutionalize a system allowing the use of “timely and practical,” if unapproved, diagnostic products in the absence of diagnostic tests during health emergencies. To date, COVID-19 test kits remain limited worldwide, but Seoul was able to tap four local companies to manufacture test kits from a World Health Organization (WHO) formula, allowing it to do massive testing and assess at least 10,000 people daily.

The country, whose “Patient 31” has become a global example of how the disease could spread if tests and quarantine were not strictly implemented, also posted information on the movement of infected cases but without revealing their identities. Singapore used a similar protocol, making public such information as where patients lived, worked, and played. This gave the public essential knowledge on whether they had contacts with infected individuals, or which places to avoid.

Meanwhile, Vietnam, which is not as rich as Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, has proven that a small country can tackle COVID-19 head-on with political will and an inclusive health care system. It was one of the first countries to declare an epidemic even with only six detected cases at the time, and was praised by the WHO for its “early detection, early isolation, and active treatment.” The result? Zero casualties so far, and of its 91 cases, 17 have recovered.

Hong Kong has reported 256 cases with 98 recoveries and has kept deaths to a minimum of four. Taiwan has reported 135 infections and two deaths. Singapore, which saw its highest spike of new cases in a single day last March 16, has 385 cases and 2 deaths. South Korea, which has tested more than 270,000, has a low fatality rate of 1 percent or 102 deaths out of its 8,799 cases.

These best practices prove that swift and decisive collective action—through a transparent whole-of-government approach, comprehensive testing, prompt quarantine, and isolation of suspected cases—can slow the virus and keep fatalities low. But this could only be possible if adequate resources are consistently poured into scientific research and development over time.

“Epidemic preparedness starts years before an outbreak,” said Emanuele Capobianco, director of health and care at the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. “If the number of beds or doctors were cut over the years, for example, it will be more difficult to compensate in a short period of time.”

Is anybody in the Philippine government taking note of the critical best practices of our neighbors?