Saving refugees to save Europe

NEW YORK—The refugee crisis in Europe was already pushing the European Union toward disintegration when, on June 23, it helped drive the British to vote to Brexit the Union. The refugee crisis and the Brexit calamity that it spawned have reinforced xenophobic, nationalist movements that will seek to win a series of upcoming votes—including national elections in France, the Netherlands, and Germany in 2017, a referendum in Hungary on the EU refugee policy on Oct. 2, and a rerun of the Austrian presidential election on the same day.

Rather than uniting to resist this threat, EU member-states have become increasingly unwilling to cooperate with one another. They pursue self-serving, beggar-thy-neighbor migration policies—such as building border fences—that further fragment the Union, seriously damage member states, and subvert global human-rights standards.

The current piecemeal response to the refugee crisis, culminating in the agreement reached earlier this year between the European Union and Turkey to stem the flow of refugees from the Eastern Mediterranean, suffers from four fundamental flaws. First, it is not truly European; the agreement with Turkey was negotiated and imposed on Europe by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Second, it is severely underfunded. Third, it has transformed Greece into a de facto holding pen with inadequate facilities.

Most important, the response is not voluntary. The European Union is trying to impose quotas that many member-states strenuously oppose, forcing refugees to take up residence in countries where they are not welcome and do not want to go, and returning to Turkey others who reached Europe by irregular means.

This is unfortunate, because the Union cannot survive without a comprehensive asylum and migration policy. The current crisis is not a one-off event; it augurs a period of higher migration pressures for the foreseeable future, due to a variety of causes. These include demographic shortfalls in Europe and a population explosion in Africa, seemingly eternal political and military conflicts in the broader region, and climate change.

The agreement with Turkey was problematic from its inception. The very premise of the deal—that asylum-seekers can legally be returned to Turkey—is fundamentally flawed. Turkey is not a “safe third country” for most Syrian asylum-seekers, especially since the failed coup in July.

What would a comprehensive approach look like? Whatever its final form, it would be built on seven pillars.

First, the European Union must take in a substantial number of refugees directly from front-line countries in a secure and orderly manner. This would be far more acceptable to the public than the current disorder. If the Union made a commitment to admit even a mere 300,000 refugees annually, most genuine asylum-seekers would view their odds of reaching their destination as good enough to deter them from seeking to reach Europe illegally—an effort that would disqualify them from legal admission.

Second, the Union must regain control of its borders. There is little that alienates and scares publics more than scenes of chaos.

Third, it needs to find sufficient funds to finance a comprehensive migration policy. It is estimated that at least 30 billion euros per year will be needed for a number of years, and the benefits of “surge funding” (spending a large amount of money up front, rather than the same amount over several years) are enormous.

Fourth, the Union must build common mechanisms for protecting borders, determining asylum claims, and relocating refugees. A single European asylum process would remove the incentives for asylum shopping and rebuild trust among member-states.

Fifth, a voluntary matching mechanism for relocating refugees is needed. The Union cannot coerce member-states to accept refugees they do not want, or refugees to go where they are not wanted. A scheme like the one used by Canada could elicit and match the preferences of both refugees and receiving communities.

Sixth, the Union must offer far greater support to countries that host refugees, and it must be more generous in its approach to Africa. Instead of using development funds to serve its own needs, it should offer a genuine grand bargain focused on the needs of recipient countries. This means creating jobs in refugees’ home countries, which would reduce the pressure to migrate to Europe.

The final pillar is the eventual creation of a welcoming environment for economic migrants. Given Europe’s aging population, the benefits migration brings far outweigh the costs of integrating immigrants. All the evidence supports the conclusion that migrants can contribute significantly to innovation and development if they are given a chance to do so.

Pursuing these seven principles, described in greater deal elsewhere, is essential in order to calm public fears, reduce chaotic flows of asylum-seekers, ensure that newcomers are fully integrated, establish mutually beneficial relations with countries in the Middle East and Africa, and meet Europe’s international humanitarian obligations.

The refugee crisis is not the only crisis Europe has to face, but it is the most pressing. And if significant progress could be made on the refugee issue, it would make the other issues—from the continuing Greek debt crisis to the fallout from Brexit to the challenge posed by Russia—easier to tackle. All the pieces need to fit together, and the chances of success remain slim. But as long as there is a strategy that might succeed, everyone who wants the European Union to survive should rally behind it. Project Syndicate

George Soros, chair of Soros Fund Management and of the Open Society Foundations, is the author of “The Tragedy of the European Union: Disintegration or Revival?”