Defense counsel makes own pitch on ‘nobody’s case’

This refers to the letter titled “Will SC ruling on Arroyo apply to a typical nobody’s case?” (Opinion, 7/25/16)

The letter is about a man of little consequence, Christopher Soliva, who was convicted “on the testimony of a single witness who said to the policemen—moments after the incident—that he could not recognize anyone of those who attacked him and his friends, and then, months later (!), testified in court that he recognized Soliva as one of the attackers…” That utterance was actually made to two policemen who came to the witness’ rescue, and repeated to the physician who attended to him at the infirmary.

The decision that convicted Soliva would have to be read deeper to discover that there was really only one witness against him. What it extensively discussed was the credibility of so many witnesses who had varying, if conflicting, accounts of what transpired that fateful day in 1994.

In the teeth of arguments over such “inconsistencies,” the Court ruled: “Persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of reference. Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot expect the testimony (sic) of witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all respects because different persons have different impressions and recollections of the same incident.”

By a process of conflation, the exculpatory circumstances pertaining to Soliva alone were buried in the mishmash of seemingly contradictory testimonies against the others and thus, grossly glossed over. The various testimonies from dozens of prosecution witnesses supposedly placed Soliva at the scene of the crime, but not a single one mentioned him being anywhere there (he was having lunch with his girlfriend somewhere else at that time).

But as to the lone witness against him who “flip-flopped,” the Court simply said that he was one of the victims who “actually witnessed the entire incident, while (the policemen and the doctor) were merely relaying second-hand information” derived from him.

That witness was intelligent. If he really knew who attacked them but thought of “telling the truth only at the right time” (i.e., before “qualified investigators,” as the Court surmised was probably his intent), he could have tergiversated and kept the “inquisitive” policemen and the doctor in the dark with no adverse story to tell. But human nature being what it is and without any opportunity to fabricate an account, that witness just came right out and told the truth quite spontaneously and in no uncertain terms: He “could not recognize any of the attackers because they were wearing masks.”

Then months later, on the witness stand, he embellished his story: their masks “fell off”—that was how he was able to recognize Soliva and the others. The trial court gave more credence to the revised version because the utterances that witness made just minutes after the attack emanated from an “agitated state of mind” and therefore unreliable. Yes, indeed, things became clearer in his mind—after consulting with a battery of lawyers for days on end?

How much do I know about the fundamental facts of this case? Like the palm of my hand. I was the counsel for Soliva during the trial proceedings.

An earlier decision, People vs Sanchez, held that “an utterance on the spur of the moment is regarded, with a great deal of reason, as a guarantee of its truth,” precluding as it does the opportunity for and “the probability of fabrication.” I sincerely believe that Soliva should have been home with his family many Christmases ago, instead of rotting away in jail for about 15 years now.

More apropos, executive clemency works, too, as “the fail-safe in the criminal justice system” where a court may have “wrongfully convicted” a person by final and irreversible judgment.

—STEPHEN L. MONSANTO, lexsquare.firm@gmail.com