Questions raised on Almendras appointment

THE RESIGNATION of Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario for “health reasons” came barely two months before President Aquino steps down at the end of his six-year term and his replacement by Secretary of the Cabinet Jose Rene Almendras as interim head of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) raised questions about the real reasons behind this top-level reshuffle.

There apparently was no urgent reason for Del Rosario to quit immediately, as a new administration appears certain to take over after the May 9 presidential election.

Mr. Aquino plugged the vacancy in the DFA, the most senior Cabinet portfolio next to the executive secretary, with a man who has scarcely any experience in foreign affairs, although he is known to be close to the President.

This is the third Cabinet post for Almendras, who first served as energy secretary before being appointed secretary to the Cabinet.

In the context of his inexperience in foreign affairs, it is puzzling that Almendras was named DFA interim head at a critical juncture of major Philippine diplomatic initiatives.

The Philippines is waiting for the decision of the United Nations arbitral tribunal on its protest against China’s claim to almost the entire South China Sea. The decision is expected in May.

Explaining the appointment of Almendras, Mr. Aquino cited the most parochial reasons to justify it. “Why did I appoint him?” he told the press.

He said his Cabinet troubleshooter was one man who would stick by him and would be willing to do the difficult tasks during his administration’s remaining 113 days.

“He has, of course, my utmost trust and confidence. He has proven skills in so many different fora and at the end of the day, he continues to stand by me in the remaining 113 days,” the President said of his boyhood friend.

Not disabled

Outgoing Foreign Secretary Del Rosario is not exactly a disabled man, as he quits the Cabinet. He had the stamina to deliver a parting shot in a speech at a luncheon hosted by the Makati Business Club.

Asked about his advice to the incoming administration in handling the Philippines’ case at the UN arbitral tribunal, he said, “It should consider staying the course.”

He wished the next administration would carry out the DFA’s “three pillars” in a principled manner. These pillars are “enhancement of national security, attainment of economic security and … promotion of the interest of all Filipinos overseas.”

On proposals for the Philippines to jointly develop the South China Sea, Del Rosario said he was amenable to that so long as “it is in accordance with the rule of law.”

He also said that the ruling of the UN arbitral tribunal on the South China Sea dispute, once rendered, “will be legally binding.” What if China refuses to accept the decision? He said, “We are enjoining other nations to convince China to respect the rule of law.”

That mobilization of international support for the ruling poses a huge challenge for Philippine diplomacy.

Del Rosario acknowledged that recent developments as a result of Chinese unilateral conduct of test flights and island-building activities had posed challenges to freedom of navigation, overflight operations and the livelihood of fishermen in the South China Sea.

High expectations

While Del Rosario described Almendras “as a man who gets things done,” given that he is close to the President, it will take more than these connections to make Almendras get things done.

We are afraid he had been burdened with high expectations for his limited qualifications to cope with.

The continuity of the foreign policy three pillars on the South China Sea dispute under Almendras now appears resting precariously on his fragile shoulders.

This view of foreign policy initiatives in the South China Sea dispute designed by the DFA flies in the face of hard-nosed assessment by the US national intelligence.

In a Feb. 23 letter to Sen. John McCain, chair of the US Senate armed services committee, James Clapper, director of US national intelligence, warned that Chinese land reclamation and construction work in the Spratlys, parts of which are also claimed by the Philippines, had established infrastructure needed “to project military capabilities in the South China Sea beyond that which is required for point defense of its outposts … Based on the pace and scope of construction at these outposts, China will be able to deploy a range of offensive and defensive military capabilities and support increased CCG (Chinese Coast Guard) presence beginning in 2016…”

“Once these facilities are completed by the end of 2016 or early 2017, China will have significant capacity to quickly project significant substantial offensive military power in the region,” Clapper said.

While the United States had yet to observe deployment of significant Chinese military capabilities in the Spratlys, it had built facilities able to support them, including modern fighter aircraft.

China had already installed military radars at Calderon and Kagitingan Reefs (Cuarteron and Fiery Cross Reefs) and the infrastructure could also allow for the deployment of surface-to air missiles, coastal defense cruise missiles and an increased presence, Clapper said.