The important lessons Mamasapano has taught us are to make sure that all bases are covered in a delicate mission, and that the more expert opinion one gets, the better, so nothing is left to chance.
In a previous letter (“Lessons from Mamasapano, 2/11/15), we stressed that the goal of a mission should be clearly stated by the leader. Unfortunately, the tactical or field process on how to achieve a goal, which has no reliable “gold standard” or local reference as Oplan Exodus, would likely turn out to be “anybody’s game.” This means it was to be expected that the mission could swing to either of two diametrically opposed directions, or somewhere in between, depending on the circumstances and the “breaks of the game.”
During strategic planning sessions, someone would likely insist that the shortest and quickest way to achieve the target is the best, no matter what it takes. This is myopic, irresponsible thinking.
Oplan Exodus’ goal was to take three “high-value” targets dead or alive. Unfortunately, the collateral casualty on our Special Action Force was unacceptable, simply because it could have been prevented or markedly minimized with thorough planning and anticipation of various scenarios including those not according to plan.
During postmortem medical audits, the questions often asked are: What was the premortem risk of dying assessment? Why did the expected or unexpected death occur? How did the death occur based on autopsy findings?
In the case of Oplan Exodus, the risk-assessment phase should have been tackled to the minutest detail during the strategic planning sessions. The planners should have known right at the start that their risk prediction was a mere “hypothesis generating discussion” because of the absence of a consistently proven “gold standard” or a successful local reference mission. It was a hypothesis based on the limited, perhaps biased, perception of a few.
Just like an attending physician calling on medical specialists to provide inputs on a complicated case in which there is no good experience to bank on, the mission commander should have sought as many expert opinions as he could. If there are conflicting opinions, the commander decides which one to take, and holds himself fully responsible for the decision.
This, of course, did not happen, and that’s why fingers are now pointing at the Commander in Chief, a meddling suspended official, an overenthusiastic field commander, and other forces in a position to give artillery support.
The Mamasapano experience has to be thoroughly studied and analyzed to ensure that it will not be repeated. Although some basic lapses in planning and execution may have been committed, let me remind those who would point fingers without any pang of guilt: It’s always easy to look back in retrospect or with the benefit of hindsight. It’s 100 times more complicated and difficult when you’re in the actual scenario confronted with the problem, and forced to quickly decide what to do next. As the author Sarah Brown wrote: “Only God is in a position to look down on anyone.”
—RAMON F. ABARQUEZ JR., MD, emeritus professor, University of the Philippines College of Medicine, ramonfabarquezjr@yahoo.com.ph