There is as yet no Bangsamoro Basic Law. What is in hand is a proposed BBL. That is one version. After it goes through the legislative mill in the House of Representatives, another version is expected to come out, supposedly one that could be said “in sync with the Constitution”; that would be the second version. Then the Senate deliberates and its output would be a third version. That is granting that on all three, the Supreme Court has not spoken. But once the high court speaks on the matter, the BBL is expected to morph into a fourth version. It is likely that Malacañang was looking at this scenario when it said, “any BBL will do.”
What BBL version then are we talking about? We are missing on the substance that should matter the most: What is best for the Moro people of Mindanao as they themselves see it? To give “the BBL” unconditional support at this early stage is mere sloganeering and makes for nothing but a good sound byte. And to say we want peace in Mindanao is saying nothing but hollow words. Peace will not come by the mere bestowal of self-determination. The BBL is not a panacea.
Let me discuss three questions Fr. Eliseo Mercado, OMI, shared with me. Father Mercado studied Islamic Theology at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, where a kindred soul in the common cause of Mindanao peace was Ustadz Hashim Salamat, later the founder of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Mercado’s later work as an Oblate priest in Cotabato (he became president of Notre Dame University) and in the peace process is something not even the present government peace negotiators can measure up to. Mercado can easily weave himself in and out of Maguindanao Moro society and has earned the title of respect “Bapa” (Elder).
A question often raised is whether the MILF truly represents the Moro people. This is a peace process where government entered into agreement with only one sector of Moro Mindanao. But who truly are the stakeholders? “The issue is NOT sincerity but this: Does the MILF represent the Moro populace? There are four ‘gatekeepers’ of the Moro polity: (1) The traditional leaders—the governors, mayors, chairs and council members at various government levels; (2) the Moro National Liberation Front; (3) the MILF; and (4) the religious leaders.”
Mercado spreads out the three armed resistance groups in this manner: Island-provinces are MNLF by and large (Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan); Maguindanao is both MILF and MNLF, but with the greater number going to MILF. (The MNLF claims that it is now the majority group in Maguindanao because the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters’ leaving MILF has decimated the latter’s ranks.) The Lanao areas, Mercado says, are both MILF and MNLF.
On the Moro traditional elite and political dynasties, Mercado admits: These clans and dynasties are both historical and cultural and very strongly entrenched in the Moro polity. In many ways, these dynasties have held together the Moro polity, notwithstanding the competitions between and among them. They are intertwined by marriages and blood. The lifeline of these clans is precisely their connections to the Manila-centered elite in a real client and patronage system.
Mercado continues: Moro aristocracy has captured the local government structures from the time of the Americans to the present. They are strongly entrenched in the regions, provinces, municipalities and barangays. It is for this reason that the MILF would have a very difficult time to win elections. The political dynasties hold captive the electorate.
On the matter of the BBL creating a Maguindanao hegemony, he talks of dismal consequences if the Bangsamoro will not act with vigilance on the fate of those sidelined, including the Tausug of Sulu, many of whom are not for the BBL. “If the new Bangsamoro would not be vigilant, it would definitely lead to a Maguindanao hegemony. Even without the BBL yet, people are already scampering after the office of chief minister,” Mercado points out. A revelation there.
There are those who are pushing not for a BBL but for a Mindanao law crafted free of foreign interference and constitutional circumvention. The BBL is inherently divisive. Malaysia’s participation raises questions about prudence: That country is, after all, contesting our ownership of Sabah. There are proposals for a Bangsamoro within a federalist system of government. Let’s face it: A system of government centralized in remote Manila has created layers of historical injustice for Mindanao where even non-Moro people believe some independence from imperial Manila is a burning cause.
President Aquino and his BBL simply do not make for the right formula. The newly created peace council makes it an even cornier joke. Howard Dee is Viel Aquino’s father-in-law. He must resign immediately. Hilario Davide’s son is the Liberal Party governor of Cebu. Delicadeza must be demanded from him. Mr. Aquino has already identified Luis Antonio Cardinal Tagle as his “kindred soul.” Kindred souls are immediately disqualified.
What we need are people who can tell the truth to Mr. Aquino’s face. Perceptions of misgovernance are not mere personal whims. The cardinal is not even from Mindanao. Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala is there obviously to drumbeat for the business community in Mr. Aquino’s behalf.
What we need are free and open discussions where even dissent is tolerated. And the lone Mindanawon in the council? What can one do as against four? It is mere tokenism, that same tokenism that Manila has always treated Mindanao with, the same tokenism that created the Mindanao problem. This peace council is a sham. Enough!
Let me ask again: What is best for the Moro people of Mindanao as they themselves see it? A Mindanao where not all stakeholders are accounted for will be the same Mindanao. Unwittingly, it is being anti-Moro”—the “it” referring to “the act of supporting the present BBL.”