Overlapping Mamasapano hearings, the 29th anniversary of Edsa 1986, and the launch of the Almonte memoir underline continuities and discontinuities in our history.
The bravery and fidelity to duty of the Special Action Force 44 are not in doubt. But investigative findings raise questions on how the planning, coordination and execution of Oplan Exodus contributed to the SAF casualties. Nevertheless, bishops demand that P-Noy apologize and resign over the Mamasapano debacle.
Did these bishops demand that the Marcoses apologize and renounce public office for participating in, or profiting from, the crimes committed during the martial law years? Presidential Commission on Good Government chief Andy Bautista recently reminded us that plundered wealth still remains under Marcos control.
Delayed deliberations on the Bangsamoro Basic Law, which Mamasapano made more urgent, risk breathing new life to the Muslim-Christian conflict exacerbated by Ferdinand Marcos. As Amina Bernardo recalled, it was the Marcos Jabidah massacre, exposed by Ninoy Aquino on the Senate floor, that transformed Nur Misuari from UP academic to revolutionary. Perhaps, Senator Bongbong has forgotten that his father provoked the Moro National Liberation Front secessionist insurgency.
But the Edsa commemoration might have refreshed his memory and helped him comprehend what had appeared to confound him in the hearings. Gen. Rustico Guerrero of the Armed Forces’ Western Mindanao Command had explained that according to military doctrine, information was required before unleashing artillery fire to reduce the risk of harming friendly forces and noncombatants.
Doctrine notwithstanding, Senator Bongbong asked whether Guerrero would have disobeyed a presidential order to fire artillery in support of endangered SAF units. Had Guerrero said “no,” critics could have faulted P-Noy for failing to give the command that might have saved SAF lives. Guerrero stood his ground; the prudential principle would preempt even a presidential order.
This response, Senator Bongbong clearly did not expect. Neither did his father expect that soldiers would defy his command to fire on rebel soldiers and the civilians protecting them at Edsa ’86.
After the post-World War II Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, military officers charged with war crimes can no longer depend on the defense that they were merely following orders. A terrorist suicide bomber gives up his life to kill his victims. Artillery fire indiscriminately dealing death from a distance could have exposed Guerrero to criminal charges.
Mamasapano offered legislators a chance to demonstrate their grasp of conflict-resolution and peace-building processes, the complex threat of international terrorism, and the protracted Muslim-Christian conflict in Mindanao. This chance was largely wasted.
In sessions marked by badgering and bullying, confusing and incoherent questioning bordering on bigotry, the exchange between the son of the dictator and the professional descendants of the post-Edsa military offered a glimpse of hope. The trajectory has not been straight or steep, but the AFP appears to be keeping in step with humanity’s slow evolution toward higher ethical standards.
The most instructive and edifying episodes in the Mamasapano hearings have come from those closest to the combat: the military and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s chief negotiator Mohagher Iqbal. Both parties had kept their guns muzzled for three years. Both recognized the threat that uncoordinated police action in contested territory posed to the lives of soldiers and noncombatants and to the progress of the peace process.
The MILF did activate the ceasefire protocol when it realized that its forces and those of the government had clashed at Mamasapano. While the AFP mobilized to lend support to the SAF, its officers rightly worried also about how the escalation of the conflict would impact on the peace process.
Beyond the congressional hearings, AFP leaders also showed their sensitivity to the complex character of the Mindanao conflict. At a forum of business leaders convened by the Institute for Corporate Directors on Feb. 24, Gen. Ariel Bernardo opened the discussions by explaining his support for the BBL process.
At the FEU Public Policy Center forum that same day, former AFP chief of staff Emmanuel Bautista made an impassioned argument for peace. Both men know the costs of war. General Bernardo’s first assignment in Mindanao dates back to the ’80s. General Bautista’s father, Gen. Teodulfo Bautista, died in an MNLF ambush.
Meanwhile, our fearless politicians talk about “pulverizing” the enemy. We have seen before this role reversal of professional soldiers preferring peace and civilians urging war. President Joseph Estrada had won many splendid battles—in the movies. President Fidel Ramos had experienced actual combat. But it was the artista who declared all-out war against the Muslims and the veteran soldier who pursued a peace agreement.
Police officers have justified the 44 SAF casualties as the price for eliminating Marwan. The question that should have been probed before launching Exodus: Was Marwan’s elimination worth the risk of derailing the BBL process and the prospects for peace in Mindanao?
If the resumption of war turns out to be the cost of Exodus, Marwan, with assistance from our politicians, would have achieved his biggest triumph.
Edilberto C. de Jesus (edejesu@yahoo.com) is professor emeritus at the Asian Institute of Management.