Catapang’s ‘bakwit’
We do not wish to second-guess the military’s top general when he issued his order last week for an “all-out offensive” against the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. The BIFF took part in the Mamasapano encounter on Jan. 25, even confiscating at least 10 firearms from the slain Special Action Force troopers; it has engaged both the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, from which it splintered in 2008, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines in sporadic fighting since Feb. 13; and it continues to present the biggest armed threat to the peace process in Mindanao.
But the rationale offered by AFP chief of staff Gen. Gregorio Pio Catapang Jr. in ordering the all-out campaign bears a closer look. “I am saddened by the news that at least 20,000 people had been displaced by the violent attacks perpetrated by the BIFF in the hinterland villages. We will do our best to protect the people and allow them to go back to their homes.”
Since Feb. 13, the BIFF has entered at least seven villages in Pikit and a few more in neighboring Pagalungan, both in North Cotabato. In that movement, the MILF’s Commander Falcon was reportedly killed, together with several of his men. The result: In a week’s time, the number of evacuees (“bakwit”) was estimated by North Cotabato Gov. Emmylou Taliño-Mendoza to have reached 20,000. The provincial government, she said, was “committed to ensure that the hapless civilians and the rest of the peace-loving people of Pikit are secured and not caught in the middle or, worse, become spoils or collateral [damage].”
But the BIFF has also made major movements into Maguindanao province. The Board of Inquiry set up by the Philippine National Police to determine the facts behind the Mamasapano tragedy visited the site of the encounter on Tuesday last week, but did not consider visiting the area where the SAF raiding team killed Malaysian terrorist Zulkifli bin Hir, alias Marwan, only a few kilometers away, because of “sightings” of the BIFF. By the end of the week, Justice Secretary Leila de Lima and her party of investigators could not even visit the encounter site anymore, because of ongoing clashes with the BIFF.
Ateneo de Davao psychologist Gail Ilagan, who works closely with bakwit or internally displaced persons (IDPs), now estimates the number of evacuees at 35,000.
So the question for General Catapang is: In the “all-out offensive” against the BIFF, how do you propose to “protect the people and allow them to go back to their homes”? If the answer is by defeating the BIFF, then he should have been more forthcoming about the rationale. Expect the number of evacuees to rise, before it goes down.
We realize Catapang faces a difficult choice. It is necessary to confront a hostile force like the BIFF; in doing so, any number of civilians will be caught in the middle.
The military operation against the BIFF in Central Mindanao is taking place hundreds of kilometers away from a separate military campaign against the Abu Sayyaf Group, in Sulu. (For Luzon-based readers, it might be useful to note that the distance is roughly equivalent to the distance between Baguio City and Naga City.)
The hostile force is different: the non-ideological bandit group notorious for kidnapping sprees and for beheading some of its victims. The rationale is also different: The AFP is in hot pursuit of the Abu Sayyaf. But the objective is the same: “This will not stop until we put an end to the Abu Sayyaf,” military spokesman Col. Restituto Padilla said. The public perception is likely the same: Yet another campaign in the long series of encounters between the military and Moro groups, as though the actual distance did not matter. And the collateral outcome will also likely be the same: More IDPs.
This will necessarily complicate the AFP’s task.
Catapang has committed himself to non-military solutions. “This is not a pure military solution to this lingering social problem. I will commit troops to relentlessly pursue the armed bandits who are hiding [in] the jungles, and another group of soldiers will work with the local government and non-government organizations in addressing the wide array of community issues that are also attributed to the existence of the ASG.”
But in North Cotabato and Maguindanao as in Sulu and Basilan, it is the fate of the people caught in the middle that helps shape the future of the peripheries.
