Can the MILF still be trusted after Jan. 25?
Let me share my three cents’ worth of opinion about the Mamasapano incident which left dead 44 members of the Philippine National Police’s Special Action Force (SAF).
First of all, the undertaking was successful. The main target (Marwan) was killed. Let us not forget that. If so, then, what is the issue? Surely, it cannot be that lives were lost; this is normal in any dangerous assignment such as this.
Rather, it is the plentiful number of casualties. If only 10 (or less) lives were lost, I don’t think there would be any adverse reaction from the public. It could have been a cause for great celebration instead of a national day of mourning.
But—we come to the second point—why did this happen?
Let us start with the plan, which is critical to the success of any operation. You see, every plan involves some calculations of risks every step of the way. It is very likely that when the planners made their assumptions, they gave a hostile MILF involvement a very low probability. Which was reasonable, given that the peace process was ongoing and a ceasefire was supposedly in effect. That could also explain why the SAF saw no need to make a prior arrangement for reinforcement with the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
To be sure, if they (MILF) did not join the other hostile forces, the casualty on the side of the police would have been much less. But purported friends turned out to be foes. So, if you ask me, who is most to blame? Without wavering, I will point a finger to the MILF. All the other culprits played only secondary, if not petty, roles.
Third, what happened, no matter how ill-fated it was, is really a blessing in disguise. How’s that?
We are in the middle of finalizing the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). This infamous event will and should make us go back to the drawing board to rethink our premises, arrangements and all the different provisions of the proposed law—down to its smallest details.
But, can we still trust our counterpart? Are they really aiming for lasting peace and integration, or for temporary truce toward eventual takeover? What did our old and new experience with them reveal? For example, after the pact with the Moro National Liberation Front, there was this breakaway, uncontrollable group known as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Now there is another unrestrained, splinter group known as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, from the MILF. Is this a deliberate move by both groups? What could be the plan?
Will our Moro brothers easily forget the hurts from a long history of war; will the victims still hope for vindication and reparation for their losses even after the proposed BBL shall have been enacted?
Lastly, keep in mind that the members of these two groups have close cultural, religious, social, political and blood relationships that cannot be erased simply by legislation. In fact, it is hard to believe that they will be fair in punishing their soldiers and other armed groups and terrorists who participated in the Mamasapano incident. Now, will the BBL, when approved, ensure that the harboring of lawless elements in the Bangsamoro autonomous region will be a thing of the past?
—ORLI DALUZ, [email protected]
