JR 21 sponsors affirm no need for emergency powers
Joint Resolution No. 21, giving President Aquino emergency powers, got committee approval in one hearing. Given the Palace’s hold on the House, this will pass plenary before end-November. The Senate, hopefully, will be an altogether different story.
P-Noy’s emergency powers are premised on Section 71 of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (Epira), which allows government to establish additional generating capacity under terms set by Congress in case of imminent supply shortage as determined by the President. Section 71 is an exception to Section 47 which bars government (the National Power Corp.) from power contracting under deregulation and privatization.
At the Nov. 18 hearing, Energy Secretary Jericho Petilla failed to show imminent supply shortage, even as he improvised and revised his supply estimates in the course of his presentation. It was comic relief when he asked for a 20-minute break to tweak his numbers—before a committee and gallery awed by his impressive uncertainties.
Article continues after this advertisementAfter all the exertions, what was shown: 1,040-MW deficit in reserves, not base load or peak supply shortage!
Reserve is part of “Ancillary Services” to be provided by the National Grid Corp. of the Philippines (NGCP) under its legislative franchise.
Sponsors claim Joint Resolution No. 21 is now focused on the Interruptible Load Program (ILP), will not entail new generation (seriously doubtful given the vagueness of the resolution), and is about energy conservation. If so, this resolution is an unnecessary and illegal use of Section 71 as no imminent supply shortage has been shown and no additional generating capacity is going to be established.
Article continues after this advertisementILP is not new generation but a demand-side management tool to tap, during peak loads and for cost, the unutilized generators of ILP participants.
In smart grids, ILP is integral to their system but is provided by entities like the Electric Reliability Council of Texas and the EnerNOC of New Zealand, none of which require presidential emergency powers to operate.
The proposed solutions in Joint Resolution No. 71 are in fact in the Department of Energy mandates, as stated by Epira’s Section 37. For ILP: “develop policies and procedures to enable industry participants to provide adequate capacity to meet demand, including reserve requirements.” For energy conservation, “formulate a system of providing incentives and penalties for the judicious and efficient use of energy.”
How has the DOE used this mandate? What are its policies, programs and procedures?
If the DOE did its policy and program work and the NGCP procured the reserves, there would be no crisis, looming or real!
ROMEO “BUTCH” JUNIA,
[email protected]