US Bases Lite
On the day US President Barack Obama left Manila at the end of his four-nation Asian tour, the Aquino administration released the full text of the now-controversial Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Edca is an interesting historical document in one specific sense: It captures an interesting moment in history. We can see it in the details of the provisions, which favor the Philippines or at least seem to assuage Philippine concerns, as well as in the overall effect of the agreement, which meets the long-term interests of the United States but not of the Philippines.
It is clear, from the language of the agreement, that the negotiators were mindful of recent history. There is, for instance, an unequivocal no-nukes provision, which on its face honors the Philippine Constitution’s prohibition against nuclear weapons. Paragraph 6 of Article IV of the agreement reads, in its entirety, as follows: “The prepositioned materiel shall not include nuclear weapons.”
This provision has been criticized, principally with the argument that the US government has a longstanding neither-confirm-nor-deny policy regarding nuclear weapons. But consider the possibility that the provision will in fact be met—because it refers only to prepositioned material. It is more likely that nuclear weapons will continue to be carried in US ships or aircraft with the appropriate capability, rather than prepositioned in military facilities not entirely within the control of the United States.
Another example: The entire Article IX is devoted to environmental concerns, with an explicit provision confirming the United States’ “intent to respect relevant Philippine environmental, health, and safety laws, regulations, and standards in the execution of its policies.” It can be understood as an attempt by both parties to learn from the toxic waste scandal that the Americans left in their wake, when they withdrew from their bases beginning in 1992. Indeed, paragraph 3 of the Article reads: “United States forces shall not intentionally release any hazardous materials or hazardous waste owned by it, and, if a spill occurs, shall expeditiously take action in order to contain and address environmental contamination resulting from the spill.”
Philippine negotiators can point to provisions like these when they say they fought hard for the national interest. There are many others, including the ones the Department of National Defense chose to highlight in its list of talking points. But there is nothing in Edca that explains why the United States needs an agreement “authorizing access to Agreed Locations in the territory of the Philippines by United States forces on a rotational basis”—the most consequential aspect of the new military pact—in the first place.
To be sure, paragraph 3 of Article I specifies the “types of activities” allowed to US forces rotating through Philippine military bases: “security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities; and other such activities.” But the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement already allows these activities; indeed, there has been continuous US military presence in the Philippines (albeit units are regularly rotated) for over a decade.
What Edca does is facilitate the military aspect of the so-called American pivot to Asia; it is in the United States’ long-term strategic interest to increase its military presence in the region, to keep pace with China’s rise to superpower status. (In Obama’s curious phrase: “to renew American leadership” in the region.) Edca allows the United States to do just that, through the grant of access to Agreed Locations (that is, the Philippine bases which meet the US military’s requirements) and the ability to preposition material.
The enhancement in defense cooperation that the agreement creates, then, refers primarily to the advantages the US military will gain from increased and full access. This is not to say that the Philippine military will have nothing to gain from Edca; increased security cooperation should help in the Armed Forces’ capability building. But history teaches us that this can only be a secondary objective of the agreement.
The United States has neither the resources nor the appetite to open new military bases. Edca recognizes that limitation and turns it to the United States’ long-term advantage. The Philippines’? Not so much.
