Why RH decision is cheered by both sides

As soon as the Supreme Court decision (Imbong vs Ochoa, April 8, 2014) on the RH Law (Republic Act No. 10354) was announced, both the petitioners and the respondents instantly burst out with cheers of victory.

Not unconstitutional. After reading the 106-page ponencia written by Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (plus the separate opinions of CJ Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno that is written in elegant and idiomatic Filipino, and of Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Teresita  J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Bienvenido L. Reyes, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen), I understood why both sides were jubilant.

Cheered by the pro-RH respondents was the decision’s emphatic fallo, that RA 10354 is “NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL (emphasis in original) except (italics in original) with respect to [eight] provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL (emphasis in original).” (p.103)

Further, the “Status Quo Ante Order” (SQAO) was LIFTED, thereby allowing the immediate enforcement of the entire law, except for the said eight provisions.

Thus, the government and pro-RH activists may now “provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access [to] and information [on] the full range of modern family planning methods, and ensure that [the RH Law’s] objective to provide for the people’s right to reproductive health [is] achieved… [and make] it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modern family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education.” (p.23)

In short, with the emphatic fallo and the lifting of the SQAO, the RH Law may now be used as “an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health and population control.” (p.23)

Major victory. On the other hand, “[t]he Court…  agree[d] with the petitioners’ contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.” (p.35) Thus, the prolifers prayed for the unconstitutionality of the entire RH Law. They focused on Sec. 4(a) which allowed the use of contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum from reaching, and being implanted in, the mother’s womb. To them, this is plain abortion because life begins at fertilization—that is, upon the union of the human sperm and egg.

The Court’s assent to this focus and its unwavering protection of the fertilized ovum is a major victory for the anti-RH petitioners. The tribunal held that “every human being enjoys the right to life. Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief.” (p.38)

“While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that the protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization (bold type in original). As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.” (p.49)

Notably, the constitutional framers, especially Commissioners Bernardo M. Villegas and Hilario G. Davide Jr., stressed during the constitutional deliberations that when the Charter spoke of protecting life “from the moment of conception,” it truly referred to the moment when “the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.” (p.43)

Ruled the Court: “In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization. For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. [Edcel] Lagman that life begins at implantation.” (p.47)

Other victories. While the State cannot be prevented by religious objectors from promoting the use of nonabortifacient contraceptives, nonetheless, it cannot force health professionals, whether from the public or private sector, to use or prescribe the use of any contraceptive, device or procedure.

Neither may these conscientious objectors be forced to refer to other health providers “a patient seeking information on modern reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods.” (p.72)

The Court said that prolife health providers cannot be compelled to “do indirectly what they cannot do directly.” (p.72) To force them “to act contrary to [their] religious belief and conviction would be violative of the principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the Charter. (p.73)

While, as a rule, no one can be obliged to render healthcare procedures contrary to one’s religious belief, the Court made an exception in life-threatening cases of the mother or the child, because the right to life has preference over the right to religious belief.

Likewise a prolife victory is the unconstitutionality of the provisions (1) giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision, on the ground that it endangers “the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population” (p.83), and (2) foregoing parental consent for minors who undergo such procedure.

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