PH foreign policy and ‘threat assessment’ | Inquirer Opinion
Commentary

PH foreign policy and ‘threat assessment’

Our foreign policy is crafted in a professional manner. It is based on the universally used doctrine of “threat assessment.” Under this doctrine, a country identifies threats to its sovereignty as 1) active and ongoing; 2) immediate; 3) potential; and 4) remote. (This model is simplified; some countries use as many as nine variables.)

In our case, there is no question that China is an active and ongoing threat to our country. China has seized Scarborough Shoal and is trying to muscle us out of Ayungin Shoal; it is also sabotaging our economy. But Bobby Tuazon, in a commentary titled “Are PH negotiators talking to arms brokers?” (Opinion, 4/12/14), repeatedly indicated that it is the US arms merchants that are the main threat to our sovereignty.

Tuazon is using a dead issue to support his position. The US military-industrial complex as the instigator of wars was used as a propaganda tool by communist front organizations during the early days of the Cold War. It was alleged that the drive for profits makes the US arms merchants all-powerful in formulating US foreign policy. However, this simplistic assumption became obsolete when China in 1979, and later Russia, adopted the market economy. At that point, their industries also started operating on a profit basis.

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The death knell for the claim that the US military-industrial complex is an instigator of wars came when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. All the socialist countries save China supported the Soviet invasion under the principle of “socialist internationalism.” The Afghans are well-versed in the use of Soviet-made weapons. However, since the arms flow from the European socialist bloc had been cut, China became the major supplier of the weapons used by the mujahideen. China was making Soviet-designed weapons. In the UN First Committee (Disarmament), the joke was that the Chinese opted for “capitalist internationalism.”

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The Afghan War created strange bedfellows, with the Arab countries and the CIA providing funds for the Afghans to buy Chinese-made arms. Evidently, the Chinese did these things for profit. However, if one looks at the trade figures of China during the First Afghan War (1979-89), one will not find any entry showing Chinese arms exports to Afghanistan—proof that China is covering up its arms exports.

Tuazon is oversimplifying the arms trade. There are actually two arms markets—the high end (dominated by the United States, Russia, France and Britain) consisting of jet planes, tanks, rockets, warships, etc.; and the small-arms segment (dominated by China). The second market is difficult to monitor, and China made matters worse when it did not join the Wassenaar Arrangement.

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After the fall of communism, the arms-exporting countries concluded in the Netherlands the Wassenaar Arrangement. This agreement replaced the Cocom (Coordinating Committee for Export Controls), the Western world’s arms control body during the Cold War. The Wassenaar Arrangement is not a treaty but a gentlemen’s agreement under which all the arms-exporting countries are committed to report their arms trade. China did not sign this agreement. Thus, no one knows the amount of Chinese arms exports.

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The selling price of handguns in our country will explain why Chinese-made weapons are ubiquitous in Third World insurgencies.

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The selling prices in Manila gun stores of the

popular 9 mm pistol (with country of manufacture indicated) are: Glock (EU countries), P55,000; Colt (United States), P52,000; Armscor (Philippines), P25,000; Norinco (China), P12,000.

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The role of Norinco (North Industries Corp.) in the clandestine arms trade is well-documented. It is state-owned and can therefore afford to sell arms indefinitely, even at a loss, in pursuance of China’s foreign policy. The US arms merchants cannot do the same; they must sell at a profit to continue to operate.

The absurdly low cost of the Chinese-made firearm, priced less than 50 percent of our homemade weapon,  indicates dumping with the blessings of Beijing. This has been the common complaint of many Third World countries: that Chinese-made arms are dumped in their countries, which are then used by lawless elements. On our part, it means that China is also engaged in economic sabotage, undermining our nascent arms manufacturing industry. Evidently, one way we can reduce our dependence on US-made arms is to develop our own arms industry.

Thus, China’s threat to us is multidimensional. It is not only using force to seize territory that belongs to us under international law, it is also sabotaging our economy.

Notwithstanding these facts, Tuazon, given his numerous articles on this subject, puts the US military-industrial complex as the main threat to our national security. One wonders how many of our countrymen will answer in the affirmative the question posed by Tuazon in his piece. One can state with certainty that even the Chinese government is reluctant to discuss the world arms trade, given its dismal and very secretive actions on this issue.

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Hermenegildo C. Cruz served as Philippine ambassador to the United Nations in 1984-1986.

TAGS: column, foreign policy, Hermenegildo C. Cruz, Philippines

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