Enhancement?

It’s all over but the signing. Philippine officials have been careful to say that the agreement on enhanced defense cooperation between Manila and Washington will not be unduly rushed merely to coincide with

US President Barack Obama’s rescheduled visit by the end of the month, but all indications suggest that it will be ready for signing by then. A symbolic moment, but also a lost opportunity.

The public does not know what the agreement is all about, or what is in it. Since this is a public that largely supports American military assistance to the Philippines, the Aquino administration’s failure to generate popular support for the new treaty, by being more transparent about the agreement’s provisions, seems to be caused by a parsimony of vision.

We can understand the appeal of enhanced defense cooperation with the United States, at a time of increased Chinese assertiveness in the region. The so-called minimum credible defense posture, which is the primary Philippine objective in the ongoing negotiations, really means building the capability to project deterrent force—but deterrence here is understood in minimal terms. Manila simply wants to be able to preserve the security status quo with China in disputed parts of the West Philippine Sea: No escalation, no encounters. (And we believe the Philippine government’s position will be the same even if or when it gets a favorable decision from the arbitral process provided for by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.)

Enhanced defense cooperation from the United States may help Philippine soldiers stationed on distant outposts like Ayungin Shoal through intelligence sharing and monitory flybys by US Air Force or US Navy aircraft. It can really serve, as one unnamed Philippine official told the Inquirer, as a “security cover.” But, as we argued in this space last month, “a credible military posture can’t be anchored on absolute dependence on one ally alone, even if that ally is the world’s preeminent economic and military power.”

Unfortunately, Malacañang has not shown any sign that the Philippines is engaged in a concerted attempt to enhance defense cooperation in the context of the West Philippine Sea disputes with other allies, such as Japan or Australia. This makes us question the wisdom of the proposed new agreement; it seems to us like the placing of almost all our security eggs in the American basket.

“Given, however, that Beijing seems to be forcing the issue, all but pushing Manila into Washington’s arms, isn’t it in the Philippines’ highest interest to enter into enhanced defense cooperation with the United States?”—we asked last month. Our answer remains the same: “That is a matter that should be the subject, not of an executive fiat, but of legislative deliberations.”

For all intents and purposes, the proposed new agreement is a treaty, and should therefore pass through the Senate test. In the deliberate rush to conclude the agreement in time for Obama’s visit, however, the administration has rationalized the pact as a mere executive agreement.

So when, as the Department of National Defense disclosed through a statement, the agreement stipulates that the equipment and material that US forces may bring into the country “shall not include nuclear weapons,” we get a specific provision (courtesy of the negotiators) but no debate about what such a motherhood statement really means (because the senators have been excluded). After all, it has been longstanding policy of the United States to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear armaments on its ships and aircraft. Every year, one or two of the United States’ 16 aircraft carriers visit the Philippines; is it really conceivable that these powerful ships and their state-of-the-art aircraft, the backbone of American naval power, do not carry nuclear weapons at all?

When the agreement specifies that the Americans will “not establish a permanent military presence or base in the territory of the Philippines” (again, as we learn from the DND statement), we get a promise on paper, but cannot determine exactly the value of that promise. After all, the US government has no appetite, or fiscal flexibility, to establish new bases left and right. What, then, is this promise worth? Deliberations in the Senate would have been a help. Pity that the administration wanted efficiency of process over participation.