Forgotten heroes of 1986 Edsa revolt
Tomorrow (Tuesday) marks the 28th anniversary of the 1986 People Power revolt that toppled the Marcos dictatorship and brought back democratic norms of governance to the country. Some say it simply restored the dominance of the oligarchy. There may be some truth to this observation.
Today, the nation continues to be held in the grip of a few families, with the gap between the rich and the poor getting wider. But perhaps, that is another story.
Last Saturday the Inquirer featured 28 key Edsa personalities. Some of them ended up as senators of the land, two went on to become president, and two are currently embroiled in an ongoing corruption scandal involving the congressional pork barrel or the Priority Development Assistance Fund.
Let me feature some of the forgotten heroes of the Edsa Revolution.
In the four days in February 1986 that stunned the nation, two officers contributed in no small measure to the peaceful outcome of the historical event.
One was assigned at Camp Aguinaldo as part of the staff at General Headquarters and chose to join the rebel group led by then Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and AFP Vice Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos. He had no troops of his own but he was aware of the power and the reach of radio and television broadcasting.
The other was a commander of troops. He led a Marine brigade of some 1,000 battle-tested men equipped with light tanks, armored vehicles, machine guns and automatic rifles.
Col. Manuel Oxales was assigned at OJ-5 (Plans and Programs) at the General Headquarters (GHQ), Camp Aguinaldo. After dinner on Feb. 22, 1986, he was informed by his eldest son Neil, that Radio Veritas had just broadcast the defection of Minister Enrile and General Ramos. The radio then announced the arrival of several prominent personalities of government joining Enrile and Ramos in a press conference at the defense building in Camp Aguinaldo.
On Monday, Feb. 24, after much soul-searching, Oxales, accompanied by his wife Sylvia, proceeded to Channel 4 TV station that had then been captured by rebel forces. Inside the studio, seated around a table facing the cameras, were: Brig. Gen. Eduardo Ermita, Sen. Ernesto Maceda, Niñez
Cacho-Olivares, and lawyer Jose Mari Velez. Oxales was welcomed by the group and handed a microphone. He then proceeded to deliver his message, appealing to Brig. Gen. Artemio Tadiar, the Marine commandant and his former classmate at the Philippine Military Academy, to join the Enrile-Ramos forces. He also called on Col. Braulio Balbas, another Marine officer, as well as Commodore Ernesto Arzaga, head of the AFP Logistics Command, to reconsider any possible acts of firing at fellow soldiers and innocent civilians. Oxales also appealed to other AFP officers to join the rebel forces. His recorded message was repeatedly aired on radio and television during the day and night.
After the broadcast, Oxales and other Channel 4 employees brought the station van loaded with remote broadcast equipment from Bohol Avenue to Camp Crame. At times, they had to pass through areas still held by loyalist forces. These facilities enabled Enrile and Ramos to speak to and rally support from other elements of the armed forces and the people. The uninterrupted use of Channel 4 contributed immensely to the success of the revolt.
Colonel Oxales was awarded the Bronze Cross for acts of heroism involving risk of life. He retired as Wing commander of Edwin Andrews Air Base in Zamboanga City, with the rank of brigadier general.
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Col. Braulio B. Balbas Jr. was the deputy commandant of the Philippine Marines during those fateful days of February 1986.
On Feb. 23, 1986, he was designated as commander of the 4th Marine Provisional Brigade, with two battalions under him and given the mission of assaulting and seizing the Ministry of Defense Building at Camp Aguinaldo.
At the intersection of Edsa and Ortigas Avenue, his convoy of troops on vehicles was stopped by parked automobiles and hordes of people. Unable to move further, he was ordered to return to Fort Bonifacio.
The following day his group was again ordered to move out for Camp Aguinaldo. This time they entered the Logistics Command through Santolan Road. Balbas started to position his 105-millimeter howitzers on the golf course, eight mortars and V-150 tanks in various areas fronting Camp Crame, ready to fire.
At 9 a.m., he was ordered by Maj. Gen. Josephus Ramas, the commanding general of the Philippine Army and concurrent ground commander, to fire his howitzers at Camp Crame and to report compliance. Balbas hesitated, and reported that he was still positioning the howitzers.
At 9:20 a.m., he was again ordered to fire the howitzers. He replied that he was still positioning the cannons.
At 9:30 a.m., Balbas informed General Tadiar that General Ramas had issued orders to fire at Camp Crame. He asked if this was cleared by Malacañang. A few minutes later, Tadiar replied, “The order to fire is confirmed and you can fire.” At this point, Balbas argued that firing his cannons would result in the killing of thousands of innocent civilians. Tadiar then told Balbas to use his discretion.
At 9:40 a.m., Balbas received another call from Ramas with orders to fire at Camp Crame. Balbas replied that he was still positioning his cannons.
At about 11 a.m., Tadiar ordered Balbas to return to Fort Bonifacio. Upon arrival he was relieved of his command of the 4th Marine Provisional Brigade and reverted back to his regular assignment as commanding officer of the Combat Service Support Brigade.
(The sequence of events mentioned above appear in the “Participation Report” submitted to Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, chief of staff, New Armed Forces of the Philippines, by Colonel Balbas on March 1, 1986.)
Just as the defection of Philippine Air Force Col. Antonio Sotelo and his helicopters is considered a major turning point of the revolt, the decision of Colonel Balbas not to fire his howitzers represented a critical moment in the event that eventually led to a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Had Balbas fired his cannons, the character of the revolt would have been completely changed with far-reaching consequences for the nation.
Balbas retired as head of Western Command in Palawan with the rank of brigadier general.
Oxales and Balbas both belong to PMA Class 1960.
