Why China matters

The inexorable rise of China to the status of a superpower holds out a unique opportunity for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to follow its quest in building a “rules-based community.” Why is this so? I shall make my argument in three moves.

First, what does the term “rules-based community” really mean? The idea of a rules-based organization was foreshadowed in the signing of the Asean Vision 2020 (in Kuala Lumpur, 1997) when the 10 heads of state signed up to a set of “rules of agreed behavior” in order to be able to deal with problems of a regional scale. Such concerns included “environmental pollution and degradation, drug trafficking, trafficking in women and children, and other transnational crimes.”

With the adoption of the Bali Concord II (in Bali, 2003), the term “community” was defined, emerging from the creation of three pillars of cooperation—political-security, economic, and sociocultural. Hereafter, the Asean Community—and not any one, a pair, or an odd number of its member-states—was vested as the institution that would eventually interpret what constituted such rules of behavior.

On the heels of this last document came the formulation of the Asean Political-Security Blueprint (in Cha-am Hua Hin, 2009) that envisaged a rules-based community of what was then called “shared values and norms.” These shared values and norms are the shorthand for the Asean all-time aspiration to be a peace-loving, stable and secure region that will be sustained by the principles of solidarity, cohesiveness and  harmony.

The second move is to engage with the parallel question: Can we dismiss the influence of Chinese foreign policy in the region? By dint of China’s rivalry with the United States, and its obvious geographic proximity, the answer appears pretty straightforward: China will either balk or altogether break the initiatives underway because Asean can destabilize its imminent hegemony. Recall that Chinese predilection on the South China-West Philippine Sea issue has been to opt for bilateral negotiations (see my article in Inquirer, Aug. 5, 2012). Asean, in the Chinese board game, distracts and detracts.

The reason that any deal with China requires patience and hard work is embedded in history and the ethos of Asean itself. The organization is splintered by divergent security orientations and a variety of normative and political traditions, making the pursuit of any regional partner presently elusive. The Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia share alliances with the West, while Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam have had ties with China and/or Russia that defy facile classification.

Asean has come a long way from being what some critics have called a gentleman’s club to a bloc that has chosen and fought for its identity to become a concert of free and independent states. And it now seeks to speak with one voice. For Asean, therefore, there is something attractive—something almost inevitable, indeed—about coming to terms with this once-sleeping giant at its doorsteps. But in international politics, one is almost always only as good as those with whom one is able to deal with as equals.

Now this is not the first time that Asean will be put to the test. Scholar Bernard Ong shared his findings (Pacific Review, September 2012) based on US declassified diplomatic records on how American foreign policy formally recognized Asean as a bona fide entity—but only after the latter’s engagements with the European Economic Community (EEC), and with Japan. Apropos its relations with the EEC, Asean wished to be included in the tariff exemptions extended by the Europeans to developing countries. At the same time, it was also thought to be repositioning itself on apprehensions of US withdrawal from the region under the Nixon Doctrine.

Malaysia, in the meantime, had successfully rallied the original four other members in scuttling the “indiscriminate expansion” of Japan’s synthetic rubber industry that threatened its unrivalled share of rubber production (55 percent worldwide) as well as the economies of Indonesia and Thailand. On account of these early maneuvers, a “cumulative effect” prompted and drove members of the international community, including but most importantly, a reluctant America, to accord recognition to the Asean bloc.

From a refusal to recognize Asean regionhood, US Ambassador to Indonesia Francis Galbraith and his counterparts in Malaysia and Singapore proposed to the State Department to shift US foreign policy: “In addition to providing material support for development of such nations (Asean)… we must strive to improve the tone and style of our economic diplomacy. In this connection greater efforts are needed to persuade them that we accept them as equals in an interdependent relationship.” This was back in the 1970s.

The final move consists of  bringing my two previous observations together: If Asean as the sum of all 10 countries, therefore, wants to matter in the construction of a peaceful and harmonious region (read: rules-based community), then China matters. It must matter because it stands as the litmus test for Asean in this century. An insight from the crucial piece of history that Ong has discovered is that the most potentially divisive issues—military power and the economy—are also, potentially, the points of collective action. The negotiations on the South China Sea in this respect meet the criteria.

Both the 23rd Asean Summit and the 16th Asean-China Summit, which came to a close in October, manifest that the game has taken a new turn. There has been a move away from bilateral consultations to “official consultations” between the leaders of Asean and China. Talk of an “early harvest” on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea by establishing “hotlines of communication” and joint search and rescue operations all point in the direction of “rules.” Rules will guarantee that the exploration and management of this massive marine resource will redound to the benefit of all, not just in this generation but also in those to come.

The dialogue between Asean and China began in 1996. It was a gesture of civilization. But negotiating with China, as a rules-based community, is just about to begin. Both parties will find themselves on a cusp in their “strategic partnership” on security. It is something new, brave and bold. It is, as the Chinese are wont to say, about taking that proverbial first step further down the journey of a thousand miles. It would be foolish, I believe, if either of them fails to see it to its good end.

Kevin H.R. Villanueva is a research fellow of the HZB School of Diplomacy and International Relations at the Philippine Women’s University and a university research scholar in international politics and human rights at the University of Leeds (United Kingdom). The views expressed in this article are his own.