Don’t nullify will of Lucena voters

THE COMMISSION on Elections en banc has substituted the will of five of its commissioners to the will of tens of thousands of voters of Lucena, Quezon, to choose their mayor. These five declared a man, who did not even run for mayor of Lucena, the mayor and nullified the votes cast for the winner in the last mayoral elections. This can happen only in the Philippines. How did this come about?

For those of you who failed to read earlier columns on the subject, here is a reprise:

Three-term Lucena Mayor Ramon Talaga filed his candidacy for the 2010 mayoral elections. The Comelec disqualified him, as he was already barred from running for a fourth term. His wife, Barbara Ruby Talaga, then entered the race as a substitute candidate. She won by a substantial majority, was proclaimed, and is now the incumbent mayor of Lucena.

However, a losing candidate, Phillip M. Castillo, filed an election protest. He claimed that Ramon having been disqualified, there was no candidacy to be substituted, and therefore Ruby could not have been a substitute candidate. He asked the Comelec to declare the votes cast for Ruby as stray and to declare him, Castillo, having obtained the second highest number of votes, as the duly-elected mayor of Lucena.

No good, the Comelec declared. While it agreed that Ruby failed to qualify, her certificate of candidacy having been filed after the deadline, it said that the second placer could not be proclaimed the winner. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled on this issue, declaring: “To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would substantially change. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such conditions.”

So what did the Comelec do? The second placer not being eligible to be declared the winner and with the votes for the winner having been nullified, the Comelec declared a person who did not even run for mayor of Lucena as the mayor. He is Vice Mayor Roderick Alcala who filed a petition-in-intervention in the poll case, claiming that under the rules of succession he, as vice mayor, should succeed to the post in case of a vacancy. The Comelec agreed by a vote of 5-1-1. Chairman Sixto Brillantes dissented and Commissioner Augusto C. Lagman did not participate in the voting.

In his dissenting opinion, Brillantes disagreed with the majority opinion that a technicality in the timing of the withdrawal of Ramon’s motion for reconsideration and the filing of Ruby’s certificate of candidacy nullified her substitute candidacy, and that a motion for reconsideration must first have to be approved before the disqualification of Ramon became final and executory.

Brillantes reiterated the doctrine long adopted by the Supreme Court as in the case of Rodriguez v. Aguilar when it ruled:

“Upon the withdrawal by respondent of his Motion for Reconsideration, it was as if no motion has been filed. Hence, the order of the trial court under question became final and executory 15 days from notice by the party concerned.

“In the same manner that the withdrawal of the appeal has the effect of rendering the appealed decision final and executory, the withdrawal of the Motion for Reconsideration in the present case had the effect of rendering the dismissal order final and executory. By then, there was no more complaint that could be amended, even for the first time as a matter of right.”

Brillantes said: “I also have strong reservations on the ruling that to give effect to the withdrawal of a Motion for Reconsideration prior approval of this Commission shall first be sought, as this makes the effectivity of a withdrawal dependent and contingent on the action of this Commission. Taking judicial cognizance of the volume of cases—including countless motions and pleadings—swamping us every day and the length of time it takes us to dispose them, such rule is very disadvantageous to a potential substitute as it can hold hostage and even abort his right to seek substitution by reason of our own delay, and worse, inaction.”

I think this is the crux of the whole case: The Comelec cannot, by a mere five votes of its commissioners, substitute its will to that of the tens of thousands of voters of Lucena who voted for Barbara Ruby Talaga as their mayor.

“We cannot substitute nor undo the will of the people of Lucena City by reason of a mere technicality of which they have no fault,” Brillantes said. “It has long been ruled that ‘election cases involved public interest; thus, laws covering election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.’

“To my mind, what is important is that on election day the people of Lucena City knew the fact of disqualification of Ramon Talaga and the fact of substitution of Ruby Talaga in his stead, and despite of which they freely cast their vote with a clear intent to elect Ruby Talaga as their mayor.”

The Talaga camp has elevated the case to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and prohibition. I think it is very clear that the people of Lucena have spoken and have chosen the person whom they want to be their mayor. The Comelec should not set its will aside because of legal technicalities.