Now and then, I think about whether governments really need international nongovernment organizations (INGOs) in the formidable task of improving the lives of the poor and marginalized.
I have first-hand knowledge of the dynamics of INGO work from every nook and cranny of the village to the inner sanctum of the management office, and in multicultural environments. For more than 10 years I interacted with all kinds of development actors in 13 Asian countries for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and country strategic planning purposes. With my work experience in and knowledge of the development sector, I have concluded that INGOs are not indispensable.
My perspectives on development took a U-turn not long after my retirement. The INGOs’ continuing failure to improve the lives of target populations, and the discernible indifference about it, are an unfortunate reality. I have realized that I need to share this with the general public.
Undoubtedly, INGOs deserve tremendous credit for training of client/partner communities in the prevailing economic, social, environmental, political and cultural realities, and, most importantly, in confronting adverse conditions. As a result, poor communities have been mobilized to collectively address issues affecting their lives, including disaster situations. There are, as well, the hardware and software interventions carried out by INGOs. However, there is no solid evidence on whether these interventions have improved the lives of target populations, which is the bottom line of development and the INGOs’ reason for being, and for which they are accountable. This stark reality has been concealed by their self-congratulatory reports, which simply showcase the completion of discrete projects and highly publicized events. It is worth remembering that completion of projects or delivery of outputs is only the front act in the development drama, in which the finale is the realization of intended outcomes and impacts.
Under these circumstances, development theorists and authors in the North and their allies in the South intellectualize development practice through knowledge management (KM) and organizational learning (OL). This is despite the fact that KM and OL have only complicated the practice and catapulted the cost of development. For years millions of dollars that should have been spent in addressing the basic needs of the poor have been wasted on costly but useless abstractions on the intricacies of development. Would that KM and OL are utilized by the North to disingenuously monitor development aid in the South in the guise of high-level discourses.
Come to think of it, KM and OL have only been salutary to these highbrow individuals. They have been rewarded with a lucrative means of livelihood, as well as the luxury of time to endlessly contemplate the whys and wherefores of development. At the same time, they have been extracting juicy engagements from gullible clients, notably INGOs. Ironically, it is doubtful whether anyone of them has suffered hunger due to poverty or has lived in Godforsaken places because there is no choice.
These persons have presented artful ways to sidestep the accountability issue, which has complicated the practice of their profession and challenged their reputation as development theorists, authors, etc. The measurement of impact is nonnegotiable. Put differently, there is no substitute for evidencing that there is improvement in the lives of the poor and marginalized. No matter how high-level, innovative and amusing it is made to come across, any workaround on this development mandate is an aggravation. Certainly, good practices and lessons learned enrich the development process. But they remain secondary to accountability to target populations, donors and sponsors, et al.
There is an abundance of anecdotal evidence, but hard data on outcomes and impacts are hard to come by in INGOs. Thus, good practices and lessons learned overpopulate KM and OL. These ignite the never-ending conceptualization of new development approaches, frameworks, theories of action/change, etc. And these add flavor to high-tech reading materials and presentations on development, as well as glowing reports to donors and the wider public. But alas, these are inconsequential to the poor and marginalized because these do not translate into improvements in their lives. Not surprisingly, the road to development is littered with junked development approaches, frameworks, etc.
Over the years, INGOs have been the conduits of huge amounts of development funds from individual and institutional donors/sponsors in the First World. The development kitty is always replenished despite the economic downturn in many donor-countries. Thus, it is not surprising that INGO key staff, particularly expatriates, are well compensated and provided for with attractive benefits. That it is their lives and lifestyles that have dramatically improved is a signal for governments to compel INGOs to account for their failure to improve the lives of target populations in poor communities.
There is the wide disparity between the compensation of international and national staff. Expatriates, who are mostly from donor-countries themselves, are given much higher salaries and allowances, etc., which are usually paid in US dollars. But there is no formal study that shows international workers are more deserving of higher pay than their national counterparts. Thus, while already morally wrong in the first instance, this is a downright injustice to national staff with similar or greater work responsibilities.
Yet this continuing dereliction has never been pursued as an organizational issue. It looks like this is a favor given by governments to INGOs for bringing in lucrative jobs, so that nationals need not seek employment abroad. However, this is fallacious because INGOs generate development funds from their all-out and nonstop marketing of poverty in the Third World to the First World. Thus, in reality, it is the INGOs that owe their host governments a big favor. This finds significance because they have consistently fallen short in the actualization of the avowed purpose of their presence in underdeveloped countries. And this has been the case since the Bretton Woods Conference in the 1940s where the idea of development aid was firmed up.
Asia’s tiger economies (Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, etc.) rose from underdevelopment primarily on the strength of good performance by their own governments. They did so without a long history of successful collaboration with INGOs.
It’s time the governments of underdeveloped countries revisited the real worth of INGOs in improving the lives of target populations in poor communities. Unless, of course, they are shirking a game-changing opportunity in development.
Nono Felix worked in various capacities for an INGO for more than 25 years before retiring in 2011. From 1997 to 2010, he was the corporate planning and M&E manager covering Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, the Philippines, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste and Vietnam. He lives with his family in Naga City.