Philippine elections split rather than unite
Textbook history is riddled with cardboard characters to hide the complexity of human nature that some teachers find difficult to explain. With the exception of the rivalry between the two Cavite factions of the Katipunan (Magdalo vs. Magdiwang), or the overblown but poorly explained conflict between Emilio Aguinaldo and Andres Bonifacio, or between Aguinaldo and Antonio Luna, all the characters in the story of the nation are selfless and only thought of the country’s interests. In order to make sense of the way we in the present deal with elections—local or national—we have to go back and confront the ghosts of the past.
Before the Philippine Revolution against Spain and the Philippine-American War that brought out the best and worst in our heroes, we must look farther back to the expatriate Filipinos in Spain in the 1880s who struggled with the question of how best to achieve reforms in the Philippines. Some were content with mere reforms, others saw reform as a stopover toward separation from Spain and the emergence of a nation. It is curious that our textbooks leave out the rivalry between Jose Rizal and Marcelo H. del Pilar that led to the expatriates’ split between the “Rizalistas” and “Pilaristas.” An election proved that Rizal’s real or imagined preeminence among the expatriates in Spain was far from unanimous. To cut a long story short, Rizal won the election but walked out on the group.
Del Pilar, in a letter to Deodato Arellano, gives us his version of what happened (translated from the original Spanish by Leon Ma. Guerrero):
“When the discussion of the regulations was finished, we went on to the election of the leader, but the majority required was not secured. Rizal and I were the candidates. The balloting was repeated three times with the same result, and Rizal and I parted with the greatest cordiality, so much so that he told me that, since the balloting would be resumed the next day, it would be advisable for us to join in voting for a third person so as to avoid the formation of factions, to which I agreed.
“The balloting again took place in the afternoon of the following day; I had to go out and could not be present, so I authorized Naning (Mariano Ponce) to vote and make any agreements for me. On my return home I found the following news: that on the first balloting a majority had once again been lacking; that in view of this Naning conferred secretly with Rizal, proposing a coalition third candidate recommended by the two opposing parties; that Rizal, without accepting or rejecting the proposal, replied that he was going abroad to work by himself because there was no unity possible where there were two Filipinos present; that the balloting took place a second time, and again failed to produce a decision; that in view of this Rizal counted the votes in his favor in everyone’s presence and said: ‘Well, I see that I have 19 friends in the colony; goodbye, gentlemen, I am going to pack my bags, see you later,’ and, seizing his hat, went off.
Since Naning had instructions from me to prevent my election, he conferred with those whom he knew were voting for me and asked them for the sake of harmony to make the sacrifice of changing their votes to favor Rizal. Dominador Gomez, once this agreement had been made, took the floor and announced that his party desired harmony in the colony and were ready to sacrifice their votes in favor of Rizal’s candidature. The balloting was then repeated and Rizal was elected.”
From afar Rizal believed himself the moral leader of the group. This was also the sentiment of those in Manila who followed the events in Spain. Friends wrote Rizal to come to Madrid, but they did not reckon with Del Pilar, the de facto leader of the Madrid group who did not want to yield his position as well as editorial control of La Solidaridad to the newcomer. Come election day both men ran, resulting in three inconclusive ballots. Next day, after two more inconclusive ballots, the Pilaristas delivered their votes in favor of Rizal, only for Rizal to refuse on the grounds that he demanded unanimity.
Del Pilar claimed he did not want to be elected, but he did not withdraw and did not deliver his votes to his opponent. Rizal kept threatening to leave Spain to complete projects like “El Filibusterismo,” but neither did he withdraw nor deliver his votes to his opponent. This is a clear case of mixed signals and the Filipino trait of saying something but meaning another (jele jele bago quiere), of making an outward show of humility to fish for a compliment or support, of saying he wants to leave when he wants to be asked to stay.
In 1897 during the Tejeros Convention, Andres Bonifacio set himself up for a major disappointment and a tragic end. Bonifacio presided over a meeting that was called to unite the Magdalo and Magdiwang factions of the Katipunan; it turned into a “snap” election for a revolutionary government that would replace the Katipunan. Bonifacio agreed and saw Aguinaldo, who was not even present, elected president. When Bonifacio’s election as secretary of the interior was challenged, he walked out.
There is more to this episode left out of textbook history that fails to teach us about elections and human nature—a flaw that led Rizal to remark in disgust, “Where there are two Filipinos, unity is not possible.”
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