The correspondence of Vicente Lukban (1860-1916), the military general in charge of Samar and Leyte during the Philippine-American War, awaits a local historian to work on it. Some of his letters, orders, decrees and reports translated from the original Spanish were published in the five-volume compilation by Capt. John R.M. Taylor. The compilation is known to historians as “The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States,” and was published by the Lopez Museum under the direction of Renato Constantino in 1971. Original papers should be in the National Library of the Philippines and even the US Library of Congress. They make interesting and important reading because not all Filipino generals took time from battle to write about the war.
Lukban’s decrees and orders, according to my former student Jose Amiel P. Angeles who is presently reading for a PhD in the United States, are not very original and often followed a template issued by Emilio Aguinaldo. The constant reminders against abuses on civilians as well as enemy soldiers who were captured or who surrendered to Filipino officers only prove that robbery, rape, torture, etc. did happen during the war.
Lukban’s reports, however, are more engaging because they describe how the soldiers fought, how successful their “agaw-armas” was, and how many were dead and wounded when the smoke cleared.
In one document addressed to the public (and the enemy as well) he reported:
“On the night of the 24th [March 1900], our soldiers, armed only with bolos, and under the command of a lieutenant, a most worthy officer whose name I shall make known to you later, attacked the American forces at Capatagan, in the pueblo of Tiabong. The result of the engagement was one officer and two soldiers killed, and five soldiers seriously wounded for the Americans. The wounded probably died later. Our troops captured some rifles from the enemy, and the revolver of the officer; also some ammunition. We had four wounded, three slightly who were taken prisoners, and on the fourth more seriously, though he is now said to be out of danger.
“On the 27th inst. Major Claro Guevarra, second in command in this province, an excellent officer, who is now conducting operations in Gandara, reported to me that a detachment of the soldiers garrisoning that town went out into the neighboring mountains, but hardly had they sighted our soldiers [than] they fled through fear, and hurried back to the town without engaging us. At four o’clock in the afternoon of the same day our troops attacked the town, killing 17 and wounding 11. The loss on our side was three killed and seven wounded, all from the Battalion of Territorial Militia. The deportment of one of our men, a native of the town of Oras, and whose name will be made known to you at the proper time, is worthy of the highest praise. He daringly dashed through the American line and killed seven of the enemy before he fell. Our troops are still besieging the Americans, who are escaping at night to join the detachment at [C]albayog.
“On the morning of the 29th inst. a steamer loaded with American troops anchored off Borongan, but withdrew after an attempt to land when they saw the hostile attitude of the people. The inhabitants lined the beach, ready to repel them, for this reason the enemy withdrew.
“On the afternoon of the 30th inst. the American forces advanced upon San Jose (Buan), but were repulsed by our troops. The enemy had one killed and one seriously wounded. We captured a rifle and some ammunition, and also some provisions consisting of canned goods and hams. Later the enemy retired in disorder, and we captured four wounded natives who had served them as spies.” Were these spies executed as traitors?
While reading Lukban’s account, I wondered what the Americans said in their reports on the same engagements. Lukban, obviously, painted a glorious picture of their victories and downplayed their setbacks. In a report to Gen. Mariano Trias—whose name has become the name of a town in our times: Heneral Trias, Cavite—Lukban was more forthcoming. He sent a long and detailed narrative not just of the hostilities but also of his two great enemies when he ordered a retreat.
These two enemies were hunger and being pursued by the enemy. There was little or no rice available to him and his troops, so they lived on sweet potato or kamote. Sometimes he admitted that he was forced to “drink and eat things which my dignity did not permit.” Hungry and demoralized, his men could no longer carry the treasure they were transporting, so he ordered about P50,000 worth of coins, bills, and financial instruments “thrown to the bottom of a waterfall of great depth,” and then much later, when the men were really exhausted, the remainder was abandoned in the woods. Only P9,000 of these funds, in gold and bank notes, survived.
Treasure hunters searching in vain all these years for the fabled Yamashita treasure should probably go through Lukban’s papers to find out which waterfall and which forest may still hold Lukban’s treasure. Nineteenth-century bank notes would have deteriorated by now, but gold and silver coins will remain. There is more to history and warfare in the “insurgent records.” Sometimes we find tales of buried treasure there, too.
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