Favored classmates
THE JUDICIAL and Bar Council (JBC) website lists all the incumbent members of the judiciary, from those in the Supreme Court to the Municipal Trial Courts, to the Sharia District and Circuit Courts. I glanced through the 57 pages of names and sure enough, every single one of them, including the ombudsman and deputy ombudsmen had been appointed after the JBC’s creation, and were therefore subjected to its vetting process. Given the scandals and controversies plaguing the judiciary and the Office of the Ombudsman, one has every right to view the quality of the JBC’s work with trepidation, as well as the probability of success of the Aquino administration’s fight against corruption and injustice.
Let’s face it: We are saddled with a Supreme Court that doesn’t seem to know the definition of “final and executory,” or which acts on motions without first doing its homework (as in the Merceditas Gutierrez impeachment case), or which cannot even prevent leaks from occurring. We have a Court of Appeals where justices were accusing each other of corruption and fighting over cases; a Sandiganbayan which cannot even consolidate cases against the same government official and farms them out to different divisions, whose appreciation of the same evidence may be different; an Ombudsman acting in what can at the kindest be described as an arbitrary and capricious manner; and so on down the line, with the horror stories to illustrate.
All these sins of omission and commission perpetrated by persons vetted by the JBC, whose articulated vision is to be “A JBC that is independent, efficient and a proactive sentinel of judicial service, guided only by the principles of integrity, excellence and competence; unfettered by the shackles of friendship, relationship, or other considerations, thus vesting the cloak of Magistracy on those who will best dispense justice for all.” The JBC’s mission, among other things, is “to recommend appointees to the judiciary only persons of proper competence, integrity, probity and independence” and to “insulate the nomination process from undue influence of any kind.” It is supposed to short-list only those with a “proven high sense of morality and probity.”
Such nobility of vision and mission. And such a disconnect from reality, as exemplified by the current performance of the judiciary and the Office of the Ombudsman, where the heavy hand of political considerations is so evident.
How did things come to such a pass as this? One can list some contributing factors. For one, the composition of the JBC, as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, was designed to ensure that members with political affiliations would be outnumbered by non-partisan appointees: The SC chief justice as ex-officio chair, a representative from Congress and the justice secretary as ex-officio members, and then four “regular” members, supposedly representing the top of the legal profession in the Philippines: one representing the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, one representing the legal academe; one representing the “private sector” and one retired SC justice. Note: three ex-officio and four regular members. And of the three ex officio, only two can be considered partisan.
But something happened on the way to the forum, as the saying goes. The representative from Congress turned out to be two (one from the Senate, one from the House), and while in the beginning, the two were only entitled to half a vote each (to observe the constitutional amenities), that practice soon went out of the window. From seven members, the JBC now has eight members (without benefit of constitutional amendment), because the senator and congressman were given one vote each. The bottom line is that the “regular” members, the professionals, no longer have the clear majority, which means political considerations gain the upper hand.
A second contributing factor is that the “regulars,” who must pass through the Commission on Appointments, have no term limit, i.e., they can be reappointed (one of them is on his third four-year term). Innocuous as that may sound, it can be used to keep a supposedly apolitical member in line—to do what the President says, or he doesn’t get reappointed. While the money involved (at least P700,000 a year) may be peanuts for a top lawyer, the power is something else again.
Which is why I am concerned about President Benigno Aquino III’s appointment of Jose V. Mejia as representative of academe to replace former justice secretary, CA associate justice and UE Law dean Artemio Tuquero, who had been appointed late last year to the JBC, but whose confirmation was not acted upon by the Commission on Appointments. The grapevine has it that Tuquero, an Iglesia ni Cristo stalwart, was not reappointed to signal the administration’s displeasure over the INC’s support for Merci Gutierrez.
The least President Aquino should have done was to appoint someone with at least as good a set of credentials as Tuquero. But he appointed Mejia, who is not even a law dean. Mejia’s outstanding qualification seems to be that he is the law classmate of Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa. Just as Merci Gutierrez was the law classmate of then First Gentleman Mike Arroyo. What’s the difference?
The JBC is facing a very important challenge. If our fight against corruption is to succeed, a necessary condition (although not sufficient) would be having an ombudsman who is not only a competent lawyer but a competent administrator/manager, as well, with no political baggage.
Will it ensure that honesty and probity trump political connections? It better.
