A remarkable thing that emerged from the recent Asean diplomatic fracas is one hard truth for this regional bloc that seeks to strike common ground: The 10 countries guard against encroachments on national sovereignty and state interests. But another truth, perhaps a more painful one, is that the finger-pointing that resulted is a very un-Asean thing. And the clear indication of general remorse is that some member-states, Indonesia most especially, have taken it upon themselves to mend fraying ties.
The foreign ministers are at the heart of Asean. Recall that it was only after 10 years of its founding in 1967 that the heads of state gave their imprimatur so that Asean would be a bona fide association. In the interim, the foreign ministers provided its lifeblood. The fact that they were at odds at the 45th Asean Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh in July on how to give an account of a contentious issue, let alone resolve it—such as the overlapping territorial boundaries in the South China-West Philippine Sea, is profound cause for concern. It was the first time in Asean history that no joint communiqué was issued. The foreign ministers have, as a consequence, courted the glare of bad publicity, left the heads of state with more than a morsel to chew on while they prepare for the Asean Summit in November, and thrown their ranks wide open to the adverse scrutiny of the global community—another un-Asean practice in the conduct of international affairs.
Asean is at a crucial stage in its dream to build a community by 2015. It will do us well to keep in mind two things: The forefathers saw Asean as a regional security arrangement based on the value of “berkampung,” meaning to get together (“kampung” is the Malaysian word for village). This indigenous notion of “togetherness,” which has its equivalent in many parts of Southeast Asia, such as “bayanihan” or “dagyaw” in the Philippines, is an informal way of achieving a shared community objective. This was how Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, a former Malaysian minister, and Gen. Ali Moertopo of Indonesia dreamed Asean to be while they shuttled to and fro, meeting in the Asean capitals in the mid-1960s. It is in this context that the broader strategic aims of regional economic, political and sociocultural development would have to be sustained. These were the “ingredients of peace.”
It was also believed that losing the region’s grip on its political and diplomatic force was too high a price to pay for economic gain. This is why, Shafie further contended, that early on the purpose in Asean apart from securing economic advantage was not “to puff diplomatic pimples in public to make them look like big boils.” This is how to this day Asean officials continue to “blunt” intramural conflicts and build the confidence of the community.
How do we apply these principles given the present controversy? The shuttle diplomacy of Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has been swift, straightforward and wise. It has won the approbation of Cambodia, Vietnam, the Philippines and their peers. Based on my reading of Philippine Foreign Undersecretary Erlinda Basilio’s excellent account of the ministerial meeting (Inquirer, 7/19/12), I believe that the strategy employed was to pick up on the “key elements” of the proposed code of conduct in the South China Sea that Asean had already agreed on, or consolidate the bilateral consultations that the Philippines had been undertaking since 2011 with its Asean partners for a proposed framework to resolve competing claims. This confirms a very Asean thing, and hence a principle to harness in the coming months—to look for the lowest common denominator because this is what works for “us” as a community, and then steadily build on it.
We must then sow trust, not fear. If the Asean countries have now agreed on a 6-point principle on the implementation of the 2002 Declaration of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (DOC) in order to make good on its commitment to draft the Regional Code of Conduct, then the battles will have been half won in half time for the Asean Summit. All claimants should focus on delivering their political commitments in the DOC to undertake “cooperative activities” including marine environmental protection and scientific research; safety of navigation and communication at sea; search and rescue operations; and combating international crime.
Finally, before looking elsewhere for solutions to a regional problem, the Philippines ought first to look to its neighbors, especially those directly concerned with the territorial and jurisdictional disputes. America makes for a good ally, and it is good to listen to what it has to say, but keeping it out will keep everyone’s feet on the ground. The Philippines should, away from the shadows of coercion, continue its “political, diplomatic and legal” approach initially with countries who are willing to come to the bargaining table. This is not to defy China but to keep the doors open to all who value and share respect for the universally recognized principles of international law. (The claimants have all signed and ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.)
In November, Cambodia will have the noble chance to keep the calm over the waters that link Asean with China and the rest of the world. It is another shot at leadership. Whether it wants to lead Asean or China or Asean and China is a question that Cambodia must confront seriously.
Kevin H.R. Villanueva is special adviser for Asean affairs at the Ateneo de Manila University Office for University and Global Relations, and university research scholar at the University of Leeds.