‘Trapo’
I knew next year’s election would be more traditional than the last. The 2010 election was not the rule but the exception. It was one of those rare times when this country voted on the basis of principle rather than personality, on the basis of belief rather than cynicism. Like the 1971 election, which came a few months after the Plaza Miranda bombing, where the voters voted overwhelmingly against Marcos’ candidates; like the “snap” election of 1986 where the voters voted arguably—amid state terrorism, dramatized by the murder of Evelio Javier—against Marcos himself. You could also call it a protest vote and you wouldn’t be far off the mark.
These things happen only once in a blue, or yellow, moon. I knew next year’s election was not going to be like that. It was going to be more traditional. I just didn’t know how traditional. The way things are shaping up, it’s going to be traditional to the core.
It’s going to be trapo to the core.
You can understand why UNA will lean in that direction, but why in God’s, or Edsa’s, name should P-Noy’s party—however he heads it only in spirit (Mar Roxas heads its body)—do so as well?
The roots lie in P-Noy’s campaign itself, which was schizophrenic from the beginning, consisting as it did of traditional politicians and volunteers, advocates of pragmatism and advocates of People Power, believers in “our time has come” and believers in “the time for change has come.” Despite repeated affirmations that pragmatism and idealism are not opposed, that the ways of power politics and the ways of People Power are not irreconcilable, which sounded like hollow platitudes, the two were antagonistic and the conflict reared its ugly head repeatedly. Not least because the politicians made it a point to try to control the campaign, the better to reap the spoils afterward. They did control the campaign, and they did reap the spoils afterward.
But it is not to them P-Noy owes his victory. P-Noy won not because of them but in spite of them.
Or put another way, P-Noy won not because of pragmatism but because of idealism. He was there in the first place not because of pragmatism but because of idealism. He was there not because he was the strongest candidate in the opposition party, the one person who had built a network of alliances, a formidable electoral organization, a record of skillfully navigating through elections. He was there because he was seen as the opposite of Gloria. He was there because he was the one person who was seen to put an end to the lying, the cheating and the stealing, the murder, the mayhem, and the all-around madness. He was there because he was new, because by all the rules of political practicality, pragmatism and trapo-ness, he was—weak.
And the weak shall triumph. And the meek shall inherit the earth.
One thing drove the divide home to me early on. It was some people saying P-Noy’s senatorial slate ought to take in “name candidates” like the Estradas and the Marcoses, time to bury the hatchet, to have a stronger showing in the polls. P-Noy was already sure to become president, they said, his survey numbers were way off the charts, what he needed was the numbers to control Congress with. That was the only way he could push his agenda.
I was astonished by that remark. I said I had always thought P-Noy’s strength lay in his image, which, not unlike his mother’s, was that of a flicker of light in a storm-tossed sea. The certainty of his becoming president lay in that image being preserved. You spatter mud on it with open demonstrations of consorting with the enemy and that certainty could disappear as fast as it appeared. While at that, even if he won in those circumstances, what could he expect to do? Rest the agenda of fighting corruption on the shoulders of the Estradas and the Marcoses?
True enough, P-Noy’s numbers plummeted at one point, the record highs turning to record lows. Which had Roxas, who had been languishing in the bottom rungs of the ladder until he threw his fortunes with P-Noy, ruing the day he scaled down his ambitions to vice president. There were many reasons for P-Noy’s fall in the public esteem. The muting of Edsa was chief of them. Just as there were many reasons for P-Noy recovering in time. The rediscovery of the roar of Edsa was chief of them.
You need no further proof of it than that Roxas failed to realize even his scaled-down ambitions. P-Noy arrested the decline by reemphasizing yellow and shifting back to idealistic mode, Roxas did not by wearing blue (shifting to yellow only at the last minute) and sticking to trapo mode.
Why am I not surprised that the trapo in the campaign, who claimed credit for P-Noy’s victory, and who received the bulk of the spoils—yes, spoils—no small thanks to the most resolute and shameless lobbying and emotional blackmailing, should be willing to play footsies with Manny Villar, Bongbong Marcos, and Danding Cojuangco? Why am I not surprised that the politicians in the campaign, who nearly brought down P-Noy’s campaign and will very likely bring down his campaign to fight corruption, would be willing to recruit politically, if not indeed as kabarilan or member of the Malacañang gun club, the Duranos of Cebu?
I don’t know that they will win by tarnishing the image, by spattering mud on the one comparative advantage they have over the opposition by their association with P-Noy. But even if they did, it will not be a victory for the country, it will not be a victory in the fight against corruption, it will not be a victory for the daang matuwid. It will be a victory only for trapo-ness, trapo-hood, walang humpay na katrapohan.
My apologies to the trapo, or the much-maligned rag. At least that one cleans things.
This one just adds to the dirt.
