Burmese days
Just about the one bright spot for Philippine diplomacy would be its policy toward Burma, compelling Rangoon all these years to release Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, to democratize, and to live up to the commitments it had made when it joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) in 1997. The policy has borne much fruit. Last Feb. 9, Foreign Secretary Alberto del Rosario met the pro-democracy leader in her Rangoon residence. She was no longer in house arrest but running for parliament and hoping to earn the right to lead her country to full democratic restoration.
In the meeting, Del Rosario “expressed his sincere wish” that the opposition leader would win in Burma’s parliamentary by-elections scheduled for April 1. They “held a brief exchange of views” about the coming elections and about “political and socioeconomic reforms and the rule of law,” according to a foreign department spokesperson. The two leaders also declared their support for the lifting of international sanctions against Burma.
The day before, Del Rosario had called on Burmese President U Thein Sein and held discussions with Foreign Minister U Wunna Maung Lwin. He congratulated his hosts for the “political, economic and social reforms they have undertaken.” For his part, Thein Sein urged the Philippine business community to “invest in various sectors of the Burmese economy, such as oil and gas, agriculture, mining, forestry and timber products, development of deep sea ports, and infrastructure,” among others. The two countries’ Joint Commission for Bilateral Cooperation is scheduled to meet in Manila in early June.
Indeed, the pace of social, political and economic reforms has been breathtaking. Only in 2007, the Philippines was forced to host the Asean summit after Burma forfeited its right to the rotating presidency of the regional organization because of widespread protest over its human rights record. The summit was held in Cebu. Manila had historically been critical of Burma. It was joined by Singapore later that year, during the group’s passage of the first Asean charter, in scheduling a briefing by the United Nations special representative to Burma, only to be overruled by the majority of the Asean leaders who sided with Burma, worried that the briefing would violate the Asean policy on non-interference of each member’s internal affairs.
The Philippines was for a long time the lone voice in the Asean wilderness. Since mainly an economic club, Asean is a gathering of tightly controlled regimes that do not want to pressure too much the Burmese junta lest their own political tight-fistedness be exposed.
But the Philippines held firm against the military depredations so that by 2010, the military junta was promising to hold elections, the first in 20 years. Many had expected it to be a sham, especially since Suu Kyi’s party boycotted the election. In fact, the Philippines had warned Burma that a less than credible election would undermine Asean unity. But lo and behold, Than Sein came into power and quickly implemented reforms that have led to what we may call now as the Burmese spring.
Burma is instructive for the Philippines in particular and the Asean in general. The Asean would risk losing its credibility and imperiling its own respective member’s attempts at democratization and liberalization if it lets renegade regimes continue with their depredations. Now that members have signed the Singapore accord, which seeks to bring regional economic integration into a higher level, similar to the European Union’s, but also with the promise of political reforms, there’s no turning back at democratization. The charter commits Asean members, including Burma, “to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law and to promote human rights and fundamental freedom.”
Long a thorn on the side of Asean, Burma has become a showcase of Asean’s policy of engagement and of Manila’s policy of firm rapprochement with Rangoon. Democracy and human rights should not be sacrificed on the altar of geopolitical expedience, as what Philippine diplomacy did when it boycotted the Nobel Peace Prize ceremonies at the bidding of China, which was protesting the awarding of the prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. The Burmese lesson shows that diplomacy should be practiced based on principle, not compromise.
