A tale of two trials
Impeached Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato Corona stands accused in two venues: before the crimson-clad senators and in the public arena, which now includes not just mainstream media, but also the blogs and social network fora in cyber space.
Thus far, the defense lawyers have demonstrated better mastery of the minutiae of the law, clearer command of courtroom rules and procedures, and superior oral argumentation skills. They have also displayed greater dexterity and adroitness in employing these advantages.
The congressmen in the prosecution panel have presented critical facts and raised issues relevant to Corona’s fitness to remain in office. But they have stumbled on technical, procedural and even substantive lapses in their effort to elicit information.
Keeping accurate score on performance is difficult, however, unless the expectations of the judges in the two courts have clearly emerged. Lawyers and laymen have differed in their appreciation of the arguments made by the litigators, for instance, on the quantum of evidence needed to convict Corona.
Defense seeks to impose the bar established in criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt, because of the high office and the lofty responsibilities entrusted to the Chief Justice.
The reaction of an office worker to this argument was instructive. Precisely because Corona held a position of trust, to which he was not entitled, he should be, like Caesar’s wife, beyond suspicion. Substantial evidence of wrong-doing accepted as credible by the public should suffice to justify his removal from office. This non-lawyer citizen also rejected the defense demand for Sen. Franklin Drilon’s withdrawal from the impeachment hearings. Drilon’s intervention had been instrumental in the disclosure of documents that would allow inquiry into the veracity of Corona’s declaration of his financial standing. Since she believed that the hearings should serve to discover, not conceal, the truth, she felt that Drilon deserved commendation rather than censure.
The defense wants to invalidate as evidence any data that had not been submitted to the impeachment court through the proper legal processes. The court may accede to this request, but neither the court nor the defense can control the release and the spread of the contested information in the public arena. The task would be like trying to squeeze toothpaste back into the tube.
Ruling too strictly on technicalities against the admission of facts in court may only place the senators in a quandary. Can or should the senators truly ignore in their deliberations and ultimate decisions evidence that they ruled as inadmissible but that has taken root in the public consciousness?
Lawyers worry that skating around normal court procedures may set precedents that can undermine the rights of citizens. This concern should encourage an evaluation of whether what has become “normal” practice in our courts actually serves to ensure the delivery of justice. But the call to “give the Devil the benefit of law” has its appeal.
The quote comes from Robert Bolt’s “A Man for All Seasons,” a play on St. Thomas More familiar to many educated in Jesuit schools. More refuses to arrest a man denounced by his allies as wicked, because he had broken no laws. “I know what’s legal,” he says, “not what’s right.” He will stick to what is legal, because he sees the law as protection against the arbitrary actions, even of the King. Striking down or overriding the laws to do right would deny him their protective cover.
The playwright scripts More into making a disingenuous claim: that he, and presumably everyone else, can know only what is legal, not what is right. This devalues the innate moral sense that tells even the unschooled what is right and wrong. Certainly, More’s own actions belied this claim. In the end, at the cost of his life, he chose to do what his conscience deemed right, even if it clashed with what he knew the law considered criminal.
As for knowing what is legal, unfortunately, the courts will only accept its authoritative determination from bar-licensed lawyers. “Hiding in the thickets of the law” was not an option open to everyone, only to someone, More admitted, with his unparalleled legal expertise. The laws crafted by men did not extend equal protection to all, only to those with legal training themselves or access to lawyers-for-hire.
Ideally, what is legal should serve what is right. But laws are often passed, not necessarily to pursue this purpose, but to promote particular interests. We need to review and reform our judicial processes to make justice accessible to everyone.
Until then, any litigation process will likely tell the tale of two trials: one for those who know the legal, who can extend what the law allows and restrict what it prohibits; and another for those who depend on the courts to uphold what the public sees as right.
