Trial is search for truth
I think that because of the nature of the objections hurled by the defense last week in the impeachment trial, the impression is created in the minds of many that the defense lawyers are far smarter and more knowledgeable than the prosecution panel.
That may be so, but it should be noted that raising common objections like those raised by the defense should not be considered earthshaking. Similar objections are made and ruled upon in our courts every day. Examples of such objections propounded by the defense are the following: that the question is hypothetical or leading because it suggests the answer wanted by the questioner; that the question is irrelevant because it tends to elicit an answer that is not connected in any way to the issue being litigated; and that the question is lacking in basis or foundation because it assumes a fact not yet proven. These objections can be remedied easily, especially the last one, by applying the rule on conditional admissibility of evidence, and other judicial mechanisms intended to put substance over process.
As we have seen, the defense wanted to limit the kind of evidence the prosecution may present. It was willing to admit the statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN) because it was specified in Section 2 of the Articles of Impeachment but not the land titles found in the name of the Corona family, which were not mentioned therein. In raising this objection the defense argued that the prosecution was presenting evidence on a matter not alleged in the complaint. As the objection is grounded on the right of a person to be informed of the charge against him, it could have given the defense a rightful claim to victory had it succeeded.
We all know that Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile rejected the defense’s objection and allowed instead the presentation of the land titles. This means that between a strict reading of the allegations in Section 2 and a liberal one, one that gives significance and weight to the generic phrase “ill-gotten wealth” alleged in Article 2, the good senator has chosen the latter. By doing so, he and the Senate have followed a doctrine not lacking in strong judicial precedents. He has correctly construed, not merely interpreted, the allegations of the complaint bearing in mind that the primary purpose of a trial is always to discover, not hide, the truth. With the ruling, the floodgates were opened for the introduction of the prosecution’s evidence.
—RICARDO PRONOVE JR.,
retired justice,
author and lecturer on evidence,
UP College of Law, Class ’52,
