That Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago was bestirred to wrench herself from ennui to heed what she called the call of duty is a positive development in the impeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato Corona. The senator-judge took the floor early on in Tuesday’s hearing and forthwith shook up the proceedings, enough to command the bumbling prosecution to shape up, to require a definition of the standard of proof that would be observed in deciding the case, and—most important—to emphasize to the defense, the prosecution and her peers that public opinion is crucial to the credibility of the trial. She is not new to this conduct; she has on more than one occasion rocked the boat, starting from when, as a young trial judge in the dark days of martial law, she ordered the release of protesters plucked by law enforcers from the streets.
(She took on the same provocative role in Wednesday’s hearing, putting lead defense counsel Serafin Cuevas firmly in his place in connection with the introduction of Internal Revenue Commissioner Kim Henares as a witness for the prosecution, and adding infinitely more than a handful to the task of the person interpreting the proceedings in sign language. But it’s unfortunate that her “termagant” stance—doubtless a play to the gallery and put on to further shame the target of her infuriation—gets in the way of a full appreciation of her lawyerly skills.)
Santiago also raised the correctness of taking a liberal, and not technical, perspective in interpreting the rules of court on the admissibility of evidence, thereby indicating that she has put to good use her experience as a senator-judge during the impeachment trial of then President Joseph Estrada. She cited the bitter lesson learned from being “demonized” for voting, along with 10 other senator-judges, not to open a second envelope thought to contain additional evidence against Estrada, and said this served to show the wisdom of admitting evidence in the event of doubt on its admissibility. She said her motive for voting against the opening of the second envelope was based on a legal point—that there was no allegation of wrongdoing in connection with it, and therefore the complaint against Estrada had to be amended before it could be opened—but that it was of no moment in the eyes of the public that viewed it as an act of suppressing evidence.
As history has so eloquently shown, that vote proved fatal to the political fortunes of the respondent as well as the senator-judges who doubtless voted not only for legal motives but also in accordance with political alliances.
Santiago’s statements are sufficiently simple. They are certain to have gained resonance among observers attentive to the proceedings but dismayed at how legalisms can so easily be employed to block the presentation of documents that would show whether the Chief Justice should be convicted of betrayal of public trust, violation of the Constitution, and graft and corruption—or not. Dismayed, too, at how simple questions crying for answers—Did the Chief Justice disclose all his properties in accordance with the law? Did he amass properties beyond his official means? Why can’t the income tax returns of Corona’s children, who purchased properties from their parents, be examined?—are dragged through a legal thicket appropriate for a criminal trial.
Florin Hilbay, a professor of constitutional law and legal philosophy at the UP College of Law, wrote that “impeachment was never meant to be an affair among lawyers.” Quite right, given that impeachment is a province of the people’s representatives and not of judicial institutions. But the way it’s going so far, with the defense blocking the presentation of the prosecution’s witnesses on the basis of legal minutiae, Corona’s impeachment trial is proceeding as an incredibly frustrating exercise. (To be sure, the prosecution’s skills are hardly awesome.)
But that the impeachment of the Chief Justice whose appointment is the original scandal became a reality and has come this far is a development to be thankful for. Let the trial proceed the way it should—in Hilbay’s formulation: “The task is to ascertain whether the allegations against Corona are true or false, and the best way to do this is by rationalizing the proceedings to ensure that the judges will be in the best position to use practical reason to sift through the layers of claims of either party.” Rock the boat.