Rebuilding a battered city

When a family member is sick, one makes the commonsensical steps. There are the medications and precautions. But there also are the questions: What caused the sickness? How can it be prevented the next time? It is the same in repairing a broken house. One does not repair without finding out what destroyed it in the first place.

It is the same in rebuilding a broken Cagayan de Oro. There was the rescue, and there was the retrieval of the dead and the missing; and there were the evacuation centers; the necessary distribution of relief goods—food, clothing and medicines; the easing of psychological trauma by counseling. And now the very immediate need is relocation and resettlement.

There is thus the indispensable question: What, on the human level, caused all these destruction and deaths that can be prevented the next time? With possibly over 3,000 people dead from Tropical Storm “Sendong,” it would be downright irresponsible not to ask this question and it would be utterly foolhardy for us not to address the same with concrete actions, or we could never mitigate the adverse effects of the next act of God. Here is where accountability of public institutions must come in.

“These areas hardly hit by Sendong were settled 50 years ago—I repeat, 50 years.” Mayor Vicente Emano of Cagayan de Oro City said. By trying to wash his hands of any culpability, the mayor immediately signaled the need for accountability. One cannot, must not prevaricate in the face of an emergency situation of national calamity proportions, and then transfer the blame to the victims themselves. From where I grew up, we could see Isla de Oro. Fifty years ago, Isla de Oro was totally uninhabited. A non-native of the city, Emano does not know that. The Cristobal Salcedo family that owned the island confirmed to me that Emano started packing the sandbar with his urban poor settlers in 1998. (Such practice is called “bailiwicking”) That was the year he started his first term as city mayor.

Now comes the story of two letters. In one dated Jan. 19, 2009, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources warned against City Resolution 7733-2006 that pertains to the ownership of the land along these deltas of the Cagayan River. Notice the year of the resolution; that means in 2006 the city council had moved to legalize the settler colony. The DENR made a strongly worded recommendation signed by six ranking officials, namely from the Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Environmental Management Bureau, and four regional technical directors. The letter’s clear, unmistakable message: that City Hall must prohibit the construction of houses in islets and riverbanks along the Cagayan River, and to start relocating the settlers of these areas. Take note that this letter was issued after the Cagayan River overflowed in January 2009 and caused severe flooding. Part of what the letter says:

“It has been discussed and agreed upon in the meeting of all concerned offices that considering the very unstable nature of the accretionary islets and their proneness to riverine floods, the islets are not suitable for residential use. Further, prior geo-scientific studies confirmed the active and dynamic nature of this fluvial system and it would be prudent to avoid construction of houses or habitation at the edge of the riverbanks, river channels and abandoned river sections, to avoid potential catastrophic events.

“In view of the foregoing, the DENR-10 Committee that assessed the flooding which affected areas of this region, hereby recommends to the city government of Cagayan de Oro that the entry of new inhabitants and construction of new units on the accretionary islets should STRICTLY BE PROHIBITED (emphasis theirs) and that the existing residents in these areas should be programmed for relocation to a safer site.”

That was not the end of it. Only on Sept. 12, 2011, barely three years after the first warning, came another warning by then acting DENR-10 regional director Alfredo Relampagos who almost sounded like a seer. He informed Emano about the Pagasa warnings on stronger typhoons in the then forthcoming months of September to December 2011.

“These typhoons will most likely bring about heavy precipitation with possible adverse impact on local population and private and public infrastructure. The general public should be prepared in the event of the occurrence of landslides and floods.”

Relampagos then outlined practical measures: convene the City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (CDRRMC), install warning signs, activate the barangay disaster risk reduction and management councils, plan for emergency, and identify suitable relocation and evacuation centers. There was a last recommendation to Emano: keep yourselves updated on the latest weather bulletins.

Over 3,000 deaths later, one easily sees where accountability lies. The CDRRMC was never convened, even when Pagasa had already warned when Sendong would strike Cagayan de Oro. Riverbank settlements were never relocated. Hydraulic flush mining in the other river of the city, the Iponan, was never prohibited. Transport of logs from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao through the city was never halted. By now, the 5-percent disaster risk reduction fund (formerly calamity fund) for 2010 and 2011 must total around P100 million. And contrary to Section 12 of Republic Act 10121, Emano did not organize the CDRRMC office, even up to this day. Don’t be surprised why Iligan City is faring well in its disaster response and policy options.

The process of pinpointing accountability should be a breeze.

* * *

Comments to [email protected]