Impeachment languages and logic
Language diversity is hard for schoolchildren, and even for the adults in Vice President Sara Duterte’s impeachment trial. The proceedings used Filipino, English, and Cebuano, but the participating parties lacked a common level of proficiency in any one of them. The need to repeat questions and responses in different languages made the process tedious. Disputes over word meanings made the logic of arguments more difficult to follow.
Does translating “unconscionable” as kasuklam-suklam merit an objection for making the behavior sound more offensive to Tagalog speakers? Do large cash withdrawals from government accounts become more suspicious when described as “irregular” (hindi sa nakagawian) rather than merely “unusual” (hindi pangkaraniwan)? If done repeatedly within a short time span, can they be considered no longer merely unusual or acceptable? Or even more unusual, and perhaps deserve further scrutiny? Not trivial issues, but frustrating to viewers not fluent in the languages.
Viewers must contend with a second language problem. The administrative state and the legal profession speak their own distinct versions of English. Joint Circular No. 2015-01, a key document on confidential funds, uses fairly common words. Dependence on dictionary definitions may mislead. “Confidential and intelligence funds” cover activities involving sensitive security matters whose details cannot be publicly shared. But they function like technical terms, as defined by JC 2015-01 and related regulations.
The issue goes beyond language to the different focus of administrative/legal and managerial perspectives. Though “management” tends to be associated with senior, corporate jobs, it is a concern of carpenters, farmers, and anyone who wants a job done and cares about results. But bureaucrats and lawyers must also worry about how the job is done to protect against potential charges of violating established laws. Given possibly conflicting legal prescriptions and an increasingly litigious political and cultural environment, risk avoidance often raises the cost of meeting desired goals, a result unwelcome to the superiors whom subordinates wish to please.
Chief executives in effective organizations determine overall objectives and strategy but trust subordinates for the pencil-pushing and the vetting of potential problems. Less proficient bureaucracies often reverse the system. The bosses decide, and subordinates comply without question and provide the necessary paperwork. The testimony of Gina Acosta in the trial illustrates the pattern.
A career Davao local government official, Acosta had worked for some 20 years in the city administrator and budget offices when then Mayor Duterte chose her in 2019 as a special disbursing officer (SDO) for its confidential funds. Elected VP in 2022, Duterte gave Acosta the same responsibility for the larger, national job. But Acosta did not have the experience, training, or the security clearance for confidential operations. Hence, she gave the funds to Col. Raymund Lachica, head of the VP’s Security and Protection Group. She apparently believed her SDO accountability was fulfilled when she had faithfully reproduced the information provided by Lachica in the physical and financial plan (PFP) and later reports she had to file.
Unfortunately, the PFP, done by Acosta on Lachica’s information, lacked the required details to identify the confidential programs, activities, and projects, physical targets, and their allocated amounts. Since JC 2015-01 also established the PFP as the basis for subsequent disbursements, the deficiencies weakened a critical control document that would enable oversight authorities to check accomplishment reports on whether the funds were legitimately spent to implement the planned objectives.
Disbursement to final recipients was arguably part of program implementation, clearly not Acosta’s mandate. But JC 2015-01 did not permit her to entrust the funds to Lachica, who had not been bonded for this responsibility. She remained accountable for money over whose ultimate distribution she had no personal knowledge.
Acosta argued that she received explicit instructions from VP Sara to give the funds to Lachica. As she explained in court: “Ako your honor, nag-trust ako kay Colonel Lachica … kasi nag-trust po si VP Sara, kasi siya po ang gi-tudlo nga security officer … at saka ang gi-gastusan is confidential in nature your honor.” Acosta trusted VP Sara as the final authority on her SDO role.
Records may confirm procedural compliance with all the needed documentation for the deployment of confidential funds. Words matter, but don’t do magic. Calling a document a PFP does not make it a substantive plan. Completing required forms does not establish compliance if these lack the data for the necessary controls.
Acosta did some things wrong. The harder question for the impeachment court is determining the responsibility of those who designed, authorized, and approved what she was able to do.
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Edilberto C. de Jesus is professor emeritus at the Asian Institute of Management.
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