Is BARMM ‘an experiment’? (2)

Cotabato City—Along with regional candidates’ feverish efforts to get elected to the first regular parliament of the autonomous region came the usual fireworks that actually started long before the campaign period was announced. The body count has already started.

I remember writing in my past articles how elections in this region are colorful, the dominant color being blood red, as it has always been regarded as among the country’s “hotspots” in election-related violence.

Starting July 2026, several ambushes and other lesser-known firefights took place in the inner parts of municipalities straddling what the military refers to as the SPMS box—an area that appears as a box on a map. It stands for Salbo, Pagatin, Mamasapano, and Shariff Aguak—all localities included in the present Maguindanao del Sur province. The “box” moniker was used by security forces to signify that the box was a high security-risk area. Outsiders have been earlier informed that they cannot go there without coordinating with any of the peace process mechanisms and other security protocols installed even before the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro.

Last week, I quoted lawyer Camilo “Bong” Montesa’s comments on the remarks of Department of the Interior and Local Government Secretary Jonvic Remulla about the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) and the Sept. 14 parliamentary elections here as “an experiment.”

For Remulla, it is an experiment to see if the significant minority of Muslims in this part of the country can live in harmony with the Christian majority, among whose members are the ruling political families influencing policy and other governance instrumentalities that affect the autonomous region.

Montesa considers this a fair comment. But I think Remulla’s remark was an expression of how condescendingly the majority of Filipinos view Muslims in general—in the BARMM and elsewhere in the country.

Being tagged as “an experiment” means that the region has to constantly show that it can succeed, and not fall to the usual preconceived notions that the regional government—since its inception—has been a failed experiment, and worse, that it was always designed by the national government to fail.

But there is a more insidious implication when someone high up in the national government looks at the regional government setup as “an experiment.”

As the “experimenter,” the national government has all the right to control the variables during the period of experimentation to make it “succeed,” following its definition of success. Such a definition could include that the leaders of this “experimental” regional governance structure should always toe the national government leaders’ line, even if it means assenting to it will lead to deep divisions within the high levels of regional officials who are top leaders of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). It could also include ensuring the first regional elections pick the candidates who have shown that they favor the wishes of national leaders, in particular, those of President Marcos.

The national government, through the Office of the President, calls this “convergence.”

In March 2025, the national government unceremoniously removed the former interim chief minister and others next in line from their leadership posts in the BARMM, following a presidential command carried out through the president’s regional interlocutors. Such actions have spawned not only wide divisions among top government officials but also generated a flawed understanding of the entire peace process that resulted in the creation of the BARMM.

Then a regional version of Mr. Marcos’ political party was organized, and some of its top leaders who used to be part of MILF have since changed loyalties after presidential tinkering with the regional “experiment.”

The autonomy, created after long, painstaking years of peace negotiations, is supposed to address long-held legitimate grievances and historical injustices against the Bangsamoro by national government forces and functionaries. It was not created out of a mere presidential whim.

As one who has not been part of more than 17 years of tedious peace negotiations, Remulla is unaware that what happened in the conflict-affected areas of the Bangsamoro was not an ordinary police problem. It is a historical struggle to assert the Bangsamoro people’s right to self-determination.

Remulla’s cluelessness is also evident when he said that the conflicts are all part of the region’s past, and the forthcoming regional parliamentary elections will put it to rest.

But as long as the grievances and injustices are not addressed by those running the BARMM—in the present and the future—after the Sept. 14 elections, no durable, working peace will prevail in the region. It will forever be an “experiment.”

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