Can the Bangsamoro Save its Peace?
Twelve years after the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the promise of lasting peace in Mindanao remains uncertain.
Governing the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) since 2019, the interim government manages a region of daunting complexity. The transition had positive effects in some areas such as social welfare and lawmakers have almost completed the region’s legislative agenda by drafting various codes that are meant to administer the region. Yet the MILF, as a vanguard of the Bangsamoro revolution, still struggles with the realities of running a government. Poverty and illiteracy rates, for example, remain highest in the country. Manila, too, bears responsibility for the current situation. Its heavy‑handed interventions over the last year have deepened mistrust with the MILF. First, by unilaterally imposing a new BARMM chief minister, Manila triggered resentment among the MILF Central Committee. Second, repeated postponements of the first BARMM parliamentary elections have raised serious doubts about the region’s democratic trajectory.
Normalization, a set of measures aimed at making this once war-torn region safe and prosperous, is also behind schedule. The final phase of decommissioning of MILF fighters, which concerns some 14,000 combatants, has been facing headwinds for a while, but last year the MILF formally discontinued the process as a means to protest Manila’s failure to implement socio-economic aspects of the peace agreement. Plans to transform former MILF camps into productive communities are moving slowly, while the disarmament of private armed groups remains work in progress. Another major obstacle is funding, as resources Manila allocates to normalization are insufficient and international donors appear to be scaling back. The consequences of this impasse are already visible after the MILF’s decision to suspend engagement on several other aspects of the peace process.
Two further issues merit close attention. First, incidents of local violence, are on the rise, largely in the form of land conflicts and political competition, many of which involve MILF members, though some are stirred up by local powerbrokers. Second, public sentiment about the region’s long transition is shifting toward fatigue and frustration.
In a recent report, Crisis Group described the current state of play as a “moment of truth” for the region, the Philippines and even beyond: The Bangsamoro peace accord is one of the most ambitious autonomy agreements signed between a state and an insurgent movement. It is also one of the few peace agreements worldwide that has not crumbled over the past decade. Its success would demonstrate that dialogue and compromise can overcome protracted conflict, whereas its failure would further weaken faith in negotiated settlements at a time when there have never been so many conflicts in the world.
What is required now is renewed commitment from both parties. To begin with, Manila and the MILF leadership must urgently restore trust. The best way to achieve this is for President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to meet directly with the MILF’s Central Committee. Whether the leadership has absolute control over the movement is far from clear, but ignoring it in the wake of the resentment generated by last year’s appointment of a new chief minister remains risky, as the central committee still commands many political cadres and military commanders. Such a meeting would send a strong signal, reassuring the MILF that Manila remains serious about fulfilling the peace agreement. It is also vital that the regional parliamentary elections be held without additional delay, as further postponements could lead communities to lose faith in the institutions meant to embody their autonomy.
It is also imperative to speed up the normalization process. Most importantly, Manila must prioritize funding and technical support for the socio-economic packages promised to former combatants. As for decommissioning, given its current distrusts of key figures in the current administration the MILF is unlikely to hand over the entire list of fighters for the fourth and last phase, even if the president steps in. While this is understandable, it generates irritation within the government, and threatens one of the core aspects of the peace process. If Manila can present a compelling offer on the packages and reaffirm its commitment to constructive dialogue, the ex‑rebels should proceed with disarmament. More broadly, both sides must work towards agreeing what a successful joint implementation of normalization entails.
In his recent address to the United Nations, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. emphasized that the Philippines’ experience “has shown that peace is possible despite several decades of conflict.” But without decisive action, the hard-won peace could be lost, repeating a historical cycle that has too often brought widespread human suffering to the Bangsamoro. It is still time to get the peace process back on track, but time is running out fast.
Georgi Engelbrecht is the International Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for the Philippines. ICG has recently released a report on Bangsamoro the peace process: Peace in the Philippines: The Bangsamoro’s Moment of Truth
