The second-half test

There is a familiar rhythm in every presidency.

The first half is usually defined by promises, reforms, and political momentum. The second half is something else entirely. It is when events—often beyond the control of any leader—begin to test the strength of one’s administration.

History shows this pattern clearly.

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo faced the global financial meltdown in the middle of her term. Rodrigo Duterte encountered the once-in-a-century Covid-19 pandemic. Even earlier presidents had to navigate Asian financial crises, oil shocks, or political upheavals that arrived uninvited.

Today, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is facing his own version of that test.

Fuel prices are surging to unprecedented levels because of the war in the Middle East.

The escalating conflict has rattled global oil markets and threatened the stability of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most important oil shipping lanes in the world. Nearly one-fifth of global oil supply passes through that narrow corridor. When instability hits that route, the ripple spreads across the global economy.Oil prices move. Shipping costs climb. Supply tightens.

Oil-importing and oil-dependent countries like the Philippines feel the shock almost immediately.

Because the Philippines imports nearly all of its petroleum, global price increases quickly translate into higher costs for transport, electricity, and eventually food and other basic goods. As of this writing, the pump prices of fuel have already surged to between P84 to P120 for diesel and P60 to P70 for gasoline.

These numbers understandably alarm the public.

This crisis is not the result of domestic policy failure. It is geopolitics. That should not be lost in any discussion about it.

No Philippine president can control a war thousands of kilometers away or dictate the behavior of global oil markets. So, it is nothing but mere politicking to find fault with the administration trying its best to survive the crisis.

The real measure of leadership, therefore, is not whether a president can stop the crisis. It is whether the government can cushion its people from the consequences.

In his address to the nation, President Marcos outlined the first layer of that response. The administration is coordinating with Congress to allow temporary reductions in excise taxes on petroleum products should global oil prices cross certain thresholds. It is also pushing amendments to the Biofuels Act to allow the use of cheaper bioethanol blends that could help moderate gasoline prices.

The government is also coordinating with oil suppliers to diversify sources and secure sufficient fuel supply. It is likewise leading by example by adopting a four-day workweek and implementing energy-saving measures to reduce consumption.

More importantly, the financial capacity to respond already exists within the national budget.

Next Tuesday, the government will immediately distribute a P5,000 fuel subsidy to drivers of public utility vehicles, including tricycles, jeepneys, UV Express, buses, and transport network vehicle services (TNVS) to help cushion the impact of rising fuel prices on their livelihoods. This will be distributed by the Department of Transportation (DOTr), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and LGUs. Funding will come from the DSWD’s P63-billion Assistance to Individuals in Crisis Situations (AICS) program, which supports vulnerable households during economic shocks.

An additional P23 billion under the Local Government Support Fund will be mobilized by LGUs to provide 10 kgs of rice every other month for the entire year to middle class workers and vulnerable families to address fuel costs’ impact on food prices.

Even before this oil shock unfolded, the government also had fiscal buffers in place to support sectors that would be hit hardest by rising fuel prices. Under the 2025 national budget, P2.5 billion had already been set aside for fuel subsidies to the transport sector through the DOTr, along with P150 million in fuel assistance for farmers through the Department of Agriculture.

For 2026, the national budget includes P2 billion under the Department of Migrant Workers’ Aksyon Fund to assist overseas Filipino workers, including emergency repatriation if the conflict in the Middle East worsens. There is also P1 billion allocated for public transport service contracting to help stabilize mobility despite rising fuel costs, P10 billion in presidential assistance for farmers and fisherfolk under the Department of Agriculture.

Taken together, these allocations represent tens of billions of pesos already embedded within the national budget—resources that can be deployed precisely during moments like this.

In other words, the financial tools to cushion the impact are already built into the system.

Critics often frame crises through the lens of political optics. They expect dramatic announcements, emergency meetings broadcast on television, and visible displays of urgency.

But governance during an energy shock rarely looks dramatic. It is technical. It is fiscal. It is administrative. And it often happens quietly.

The Philippines did not choose this conflict. It cannot control how long it lasts.

What it can do is prepare its institutions, its budgets, and its policies to protect its people from the worst of the fallout.

That, ultimately, is the real test of leadership in the second half of the Marcos Jr. presidency.