The Bangsamoro crucible

March 27, 2026, marks the 12th anniversary of the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB). This landmark agreement was translated into law through the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) of 2018, officially creating the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) upon its ratification in 2019.

However, the path to political maturity has been anything but linear. The first BARMM election, originally slated for 2022, has faced a carousel of postponements: first to May 2025 due to pandemic recovery, then to October 2025. Following the Supreme Court ruling removing Sulu from the BARMM, it moved again to March 2026. Now, in the middle of March, the House of Representatives has proposed yet another schedule: September 14, 2026.

The normalization bottleneck

While elections establish political legitimacy, they are also a critical trigger for “normalization”—the process of demobilization, decommissioning, and reintegration (DDR) of armed combatants into civilian life. While political agreements formalize legal commitments, normalization seeks to eliminate the use of violence as a means of advancing group interests.

The normalization process between the GPH and MILF is designed as a series of phased, synchronized measures:

• Phase 1: Triggered by the BOL ratification; 30 percent of MILF combatants are decommissioned.
• Phase 2: Commences once the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) assumes governance, requiring the rollout of socioeconomic development programs and an additional 35 percent decommissioning.
• Phase 3: The final 35 percent of combatants are to be decommissioned. Crucially, this stage is contingent upon the holding of elections and the establishment of a duly elected Bangsamoro government.

We are currently at this final, precarious threshold. Data from the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation, and Unity (OPAPRU) shows that 26,145 combatants—about 65 percent—have been decommissioned. But the gears have ground to a halt.

A crisis of trust

On July 26, 2025, the MILF issued a resolution declaring that the decommissioning of the remaining 14,000 combatants will not proceed until there is “substantial compliance” from the GPH regarding socioeconomic packages for those already decommissioned.

This deadlock, coupled with repeated election delays, poses a serious hurdle. Many of these challenges stem from weak institutional coordination, procedural red tape, and a reluctance of agencies to act decisively for fear of adverse findings from audit bodies. Civil society groups are rightly concerned: uncertainty is eroding trust.

The accountability gap

The peace process is fundamentally co-owned, but co-ownership demands a difficult conversation about accountability. What level of shared responsibility is acceptable? To what extent should a non-state actor exercise influence over program implementation?

Perhaps most critically: how do we structure accountability when oversight institutions have jurisdiction over state agencies but limited authority over non-state actors?

There is also an institutional mismatch at play. While BARMM is intended to function under a parliamentary system, its administrative processes—from development planning to financial management—still largely mirror the templates of the national government’s presidential structure. This creates inherent tensions that impede the very autonomy the BOL was meant to foster.

The stakes of stalling

The normalization process must be brought back on track. The presence of 14,000-armed ex-combatants represent a significant force that requires careful management. Prolonged delays and a loss of momentum risk creating perceptions of state neglect—conditions that opportunistic groups are all too ready to exploit to reignite armed rebellion.

The peace process opened a political space that allowed state institutions to rebuild legitimacy and provided the MILF an opportunity to demonstrate governance. Preserving this space now requires more than just signatures on a page; it requires the political will to ensure that the hard-won gains of the last twelve years are not lost to the “crucible” of bureaucracy and delay.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Dr. Jennifer Santiago Oreta is the Dean of the Ateneo School of Government (ASoG). She is an expert in security governance and peacebuilding, having served as Assistant Secretary for Policy at the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP).