‘Sulexit’—a pyrrhic victory? (1)

Cotabato City—A bombshell literally shook the entire Bangsamoro autonomous regional leadership on Monday, Sept. 9. On that day, the Supreme Court released its unanimous ruling on upholding the constitutionality of the Bangsamoro organic law (BOL) that created the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). However, it also came with the decision, with finality, that the province of Sulu is no longer a part of the BARMM provinces. This second part of the decision declaring that Sulu cannot be part of the region was based on the results of the 2019 plebiscite conducted there that yielded a 54-percent rejection of the votes on the inclusion of Sulu in the BARMM.

In 2018, former Sulu provincial governor Abdusakur A. Tan II, patriarch of the most influential political family in the province, petitioned the Supreme Court to declare the BOL unconstitutional and for Sulu’s exclusion from the BARMM. Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, member of the high court since 2012, penned the decision, with concurrence from Associate Justice Japar Dimaampao, a Meranaw, appointed in 2021; and agreed on unanimously by the 15-member Supreme Court.

Many insiders in the regional government consider this as something they had somehow forgotten. They thought this decision would never come, but it did. And it came at a time when they least expected it—the month before the filing of candidacies for the region’s first parliamentary elections in 2025 that coincides with the national midterm elections. More “pampasabog” news are expected to come from the Supreme Court as a result of this historic decision.

Many officials and functionaries in the region reacted with disbelief and had difficulty wrapping their heads around this new reality in the short lifespan of the fledgling region—how can the Bangsamoro autonomous region not have a province like Sulu? The Sulu part of the Bangsamoro narrative of armed struggle and traumatic experiences, especially before, during, and after the declaration of martial law in 1972 is central to the Bangsamoro journey toward attaining their inherent right of self-determination.

Among the first leaders of what would later become the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) are from Sulu, like Nur Misuari, acknowledged as one of the founders and longtime chair of this revolutionary group that agreed to a peace process with the Philippine government. During the administration of former president Fidel V. Ramos. Ramos, chief negotiator Manuel Yan, and Misuari signed the “Final Peace Agreement” between the MNLF and the Philippine government on Sept. 2, 1996. After this failed in putting a stop to the hostilities in the region, another peace process ensued, between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), after this group split from the MNLF.

The MILF-Government of the Philippines’ peace agreement, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), was signed in March 2014. The CAB led to the formulation of the organic law. The government of the BARMM today is composed of MILF senior leaders, with its chair, Ahod Balawag Ibrahim, aka Kagi Murad, as the region’s interim chief minister.

Some friends from civil society organizations were feverishly posting sad emojis on social media, while a few became overly emotional about this decision. But there are others rejoicing in this decision, citing grievances of having been left out of what they perceive as a Magindanawn-Meranaw-dominated regional leadership in both the transitional parliament and in the entire Bangsamoro autonomous government bureaucracy. Others think there will be a surge of economic development in the province of Sulu, after its exit from the BARMM. It will now be a part of the national government’s local government units attached to Region 9 administrative region based in Zamboanga City. Still others think that this decision was released in time to create repercussions in the region’s political dynamics, possibly leading to an extension of the transition period (at least for the regional parliamentary elections).

The MILF leadership welcomed this decision, especially on upholding the constitutionality of the BOL. But it was received with high levels of trepidation, as it was like a pyrrhic victory for both the region and the constituents of the Sulu provincial government. A pyrrhic victory is not worth celebrating because so much is lost as its cost. The term is from Pyrrhus, the king of an ancient kingdom who defeated the Romans in 279 BCE (Before the Common Era).

Some local political observers consider the “Sulexit” (from Brexit, after Great Britain exited the European Union) as something like a victory, but at huge costs, especially for the constituents and regional government functionaries based in Sulu province.

(To be concluded)

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