Another take on giving police power to determine probable cause
In his letter titled “Ignorance of the law” (5/16/24), Rex Rico railed against a lawmaker’s proposal to give police authorities with the “power to determine probable cause,” that is, whether or not to detain a person involved in a vehicular accident. Rico stressed that their only job under the prevailing law is to “investigate” and then promptly refer the matter to a public prosecutor in whom is primarily vested the task of making that determination, filing criminal charges (if he finds “probable cause”), and securing an arrest warrant from the court. Here’s our takeaway on that newfangled proposal. A client of ours was driving his car on a highway when a pedestrian suddenly jumped out of a bushy center island and got his head smashed against his car’s windshield. Despite his shock, our client managed to bring him to a hospital where the crazed jumper was declared dead on arrival. Police authorities came by later and immediately put “the suspect” (our client) under arrest and impounded his car. It was just “routine,” he was told.
A closer inspection of the car revealed it had no broken front lights, no dents on its fenders, no deformation on any part of its front bumper, and blood all over its shattered windshield. That was irrefragable proof that the jaywalker was not hit while crossing the road but flew straight to the car’s windshield. That should have been enough to let our client go. But police authorities had no choice but to refer the matter to the public prosecutor for proper disposition.
Thus, our client was kept in custody for a few more days until a case was actually filed in court against him for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide! Only then was he able to post bail. Needless to say, that was “standard operating procedure” in criminal prosecution for reckless imprudence where a victim is injured or dies regardless of any evidence, leaving it up to the court to rule on the guilt or innocence of the accused. And after more than a year of trial proceedings, the accused was finally exonerated.
We agree that in some cases, police authorities should be empowered by law to determine who is at fault right from the get-go and to make the decision of letting a “suspect” go. Freedom is too precious a right to be made dependent on some pencil-pushing ritual. The current “practice and procedure” render them inutile to do justice to the innocent like our client under the circumstances narrated above. True it may be that police authorities are less competent than public prosecutors in matters of the law and evidence. But no one has a monopoly on plain, common sense!
Steve L. Monsanto,
