Strategic reset: Marcos, Australia, and Asean
The long-standing friendship between our two great nations transcends the 78 years of our formal diplomatic relations,” declared Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in his spirited address before the Australian Parliament last week.
“These bonds trace their roots as far back as the 1860s when Filipino pearl divers, known to you then as the Manilamen, found their way to your shores as early purveyors of globalization,” he continued, tracing the depth of bilateral relations to the dawn of modernity in the Asia-Pacific region.
Crucially, not only Mr. Marcos rightly emphasized the Filipino migrants’ contribution to the “Australian economy” and “Australian life,” but also the Philippines’ role in preserving a rules-based international order. “We must protect the peace that we fought for during the war and have jealously guarded in the decades since,” he argued, underscoring the need for expanded bilateral cooperation. “We must oppose actions that clearly denigrate the rule of law,” he added, referring to China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea.
The 17-minute speech, at once passionate and parsimonious, rightly reflected the depth of our bilateral ties to Australia. My own grandmother—who saved her father from getting buried alive by Japanese imperial forces by spontaneously reciting the occupying forces’ national anthem, just to be forced into exile in mountains shortly after—once told me about how Australian soldiers saved her community in the Ilocos region toward the end of World War II.
Lest we forget, Australian forces suffered their single deadliest day in World War II during their joint operations with Filipino patriots against Imperial Japan. But it was during the past decade that bilateral ties entered a new phase.
First came the Comprehensive Partnership deal signed during Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s visit to Manila in 2015. This paved the way for decisive assistance by Canberra during the Marawi crisis as well as expanded bilateral maritime security cooperation with an eye on the South China Sea disputes. Then came last year’s Strategic Partnership pact during Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to Manila, which aims to bring about a new “golden era” in bilateral ties.
Six years ago, I had the privilege of attending a track II event on the sidelines of the inaugural Australia-Asean Summit in Sydney, where I ended up explaining why our then pro-Beijing President Rodrigo Duterte was the only no-show leader from Asean. Last week, however, we saw a Philippine President setting the tone for the latest iteration of the Australia-Asean Summit by delivering a spirited speech before the Australian Parliament.
This represents nothing short of a “sea change” in Philippine-Australia ties, especially with both countries vowing to step up their joint naval drills and military cooperation in light of Beijing’s bullying behavior in adjacent waters. But this time around, my fear is that the Philippines may end up as an outlier for completely opposite reasons.
During his state visit to Down Under, Mr. Marcos not only highlighted China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea, but also sought to rally traditional partners such as Australia to jointly hold the line for a rules-based international order. The problem, however, is that I doubt other Asean leaders will follow suit.
Malaysia’s current leadership seems more interested in bashing the West’s double-standards in the Middle East than pointing out China’s atrocious treatment of its own Muslim minority groups. Ironically, it’s the “old guards” in Putrajaya who are now taking up the cudgels for Malaysia’s claims in the South China Sea. Both Singapore and Vietnam, meanwhile, have adopted an increasingly Beijing-friendly diplomatic language in recent years in order to reap economic rewards.
As for Indonesia, we are yet to see how the incoming Prabowo administration will exercise regional leadership, if at all. As for majority of continental Southeast Asian nations, they seem more invested in their bilateral relations with China than standing up for so-called “Asean centrality.”
Nevertheless, the only way forward is for a constructive form of “Asean minilateralism,” whereby key Southeast Asian states steadily yet subtly coordinate a more robust position against China’s hegemonic excesses in tandem with middle powers such as Australia. Otherwise, either Asean fades into geopolitical irrelevance and/or the Philippines continues its quiet drift away from fellow Southeast Asian nations in favor of traditional Western partners.
