Will Maria Ressa, Jinggoy Estrada be acquitted?
In Causing v. People (Oct. 11, 2023), the Supreme Court (Third Division) said that cyberlibel prescribes in one year, not in 15 years. Based on this one-year prescriptive period, may Maria Ressa be acquitted as hinted in an Inquirer news report on Jan. 21? Also, Sen. Jinggoy Estrada was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan (SBN) of plunder but convicted of direct and indirect bribery. May an appeal to the Supreme Court (SC) lead to his total acquittal, as he hopes?
LADIES FIRST. LET US DISCUSS RESSA’S CASE FIRST, THEN ESTRADA’S. Berteni Causing, a lawyer, was charged in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City with cyberlibel in two separate Informations, both dated May 10, 2021, arising from his two Facebook posts on Feb. 4, 2019, and April 29, 2019, “which made it appear that [Rep. Ferdinand Hernandez] stole public funds intended for the Marawi victims.” (Please note the dates.) On June 28, 2021, he filed a “Motion to Quash” on the ground that the crime had prescribed.
Upon denial of both this motion and his subsequent Motion for Reconsideration (MR), he challenged both orders of denial in a “Petition for Certiorari” direct to the Supreme Court, without undergoing proceedings in the RTC and in the Court of Appeals (CA), insisting that cyberlibel had prescribed in one year; thus, he could no longer be prosecuted for it.
Writing for the Supreme Court (Third Division), Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting—concurred in by JJs Alfredo Benjamin S. Caquioa (Division Chairman), Samuel H. Gaerlan, Japar Dimaampao, and Maria Filomena D. Singh (with Separate Concurring Opinion)—held that cyberlibel prescribes in one year; thereby “abandon[ing] the … doctrine” of 15 years laid out in an Unsigned Extended Resolution in Tolentino v. People (Aug. 6, 2018).
Though he won his legal battle, Causing was not acquitted because the one-year period was to be counted “from [the] discovery of the published libelous matter by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents …” not necessarily from the dates they were posted in Facebook. Inasmuch as Causing did not allege, much less prove, the date the complainant discovered the Facebook postings, the Court denied the petition, without acquitting him. The net result is that the proceedings in the RTC would continue. Nonetheless, back in the RTC, he could, IMHO, present evidence on the date of discovery, subject, of course, to relevant procedural and evidentiary rules.
UNLIKE CAUSING, RESSA DID NOT GO STRAIGHT TO THE SUPREME COURT. Instead, she went through the normal process in the RTC, which, after trial, convicted her of cyberlibel. The CA denied her appeal and affirmed her guilt, ruling that the prescriptive period is 15 years based on Tolentino v. People. It was only then that she brought her case to the Supreme Court. In my earlier columns, I opined that (like Causing), Ressa should have gone direct to the Supreme Court to seek acquittal based on the one-year prescriptive period now ordained by the Court (Third Division). Question: Is she nonetheless entitled to an acquittal? Answer: IMHO, yes, but subject to two qualifications.
First, she should have proven in the RTC and/or CA that Wilfredo Keng, the complainant in her case, filed his complaint after one year, or more, had elapsed from his discovery of the libelous matter posted in the Rappler.
Second, her case should be ruled upon by the Court en banc, not just by a Division because under the Constitution (Article VIII, Section 4, Item 3). “… [N]o doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.” In short, the one-year prescriptive period that “abandoned” the 15-year ruling should be “modified” to one year only “by the court sitting en banc,” not by the Supreme Court sitting in division.
AFTER RENDERING ITS EXHAUSTIVE, COMPREHENSIVE, AND WELL-WRITTEN 360-PAGE PER CURIAM DECISION, the SBN, IMHO, would not just suddenly somersault and acquit Estrada totally and completely. On the other hand, his planned appeal to the Supreme Court is very risky, given that he had already been acquitted of plunder, a capital offense, while he had been convicted merely of direct and indirect bribery. You see, “In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors … or even reverse[d] the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law” (People v. XXX, June 21, 2021).
In short, his appeal invalidates the immediate finality of his acquittal for plunder, reopens the entire case, and renders him vulnerable to a conviction for plunder. Of course, an appeal could also acquit him completely and absolve him totally of any penal and civil liabilities and their accessory penalties, like perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Will he take the risk? Abangan.
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