Confluence in the evolving Indo-Pacific
South Korea’s Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region indicates its readiness to play a greater role in the region. Released last December, it signaled the importance attached by Seoul to a vast and crucial geography that drives global growth but is also mired by flashpoints and geopolitical discord. The country is positioning itself as a global pivotal state and has launched a strategy to pursue that. Such a posture by a capable middle power bears on regional states trying to broaden their options and partners.
South Korea puts emphasis on contributive diplomacy. It prides itself as the “only country to rise up from being among the world’s poorest country on the receiving end of aid to become an OECD donor country.” The country proclaims that it “is ready to share the experiences and knowledge accumulated thus far, and help meet the aspirations of the countries in the region to achieve national development and economic growth.” This message resonates well with the Philippines.
Both the Philippines and South Korea are strategic Indo-Pacific coastal states. Both have heavy trade exposure with their big neighbor, China, and are treaty allies of the United States. Fraught relations between these two important great powers put third countries in the crossfire. Manila and Seoul share the same challenge of navigating a more complex and turbulent external environment.
South Korea is the world’s 13th-largest economy, sixth-strongest military, and ninth-largest arms exporter. It is one of the world’s fastest-rising defense suppliers and plans to become the world’s fourth biggest by 2027. Last year, it was the Philippines’ seventh-largest market and fourth-largest import source. Two-way trade is expected to get a boost from a bilateral free trade agreement under negotiations. Both sides are also discussing collaboration on core raw materials supply and the nuclear reactor industry, which can enhance supply chain resilience and energy security. Its Indo-Pacific strategy can open more spaces for cooperation on semiconductors, electric vehicles, digital connectivity, and the production of agricultural machinery, among others.
In infrastructure, Hyundai Engineering and Construction and Dong-ah Geological Engineering are participating in the first segment of the South Commuter Railway Project. South Korea’s Eximbank will also finance the Panay-Guimaras-Negros Island bridges while the Samar Pacific Coastal Road it is funding has been inaugurated. These burnish Seoul’s credentials as a reliable partner for the Marcos administration’s “Build Better More” program.
Defense cooperation is also deepening. Before the full-scale war in Ukraine last year, the Philippines was the biggest buyer of Korean arms. Seoul delivered Manila’s first two modern frigates and transferred a decommissioned corvette, which has since become one of the navy’s most heavily armed assets. Manila also ordered two brand-new corvettes and six offshore patrol vessels. Korea also supplied the Philippines with a squadron of 12 FA-50 light attack and trainer aircraft.
Aside from defense sales, security dialogue and drills are also on the upswing. The first maritime dialogue between both sides was held in Busan last September, followed by the debut participation of Korea’s Marine Corps in the Philippine-US Kamandag exercises the month after. Last December, the second Navy-to-Navy Talks between the two took place in Busan. South Korea also dispatched its Cheonjabong landing ship to San Fernando, La Union, last month to take part in the Pacific Partnership multinational humanitarian exercise. Its coast guard also helped in the Mindoro oil spill cleanup last April.
South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy marks a bold and profound shift in Seoul’s foreign policy. It shed some longstanding inhibitions and put it firmly standing in support of a rules-based order. Seoul has linked the security of the Korean Peninsula with developments in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, two hotspots it has long tried to avoid wading into. In its strategy document, Korea underscored the disputed sea’s importance as a passageway for 64 percent of its crude oil and 46 percent of its natural gas shipments. Hence, it maintained that “peace, stability, and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, which constitutes strategically important sea lines of communication, must be respected.”
Last month, after China Coast Guard vessels used water cannon to disrupt a routine Philippine resupply mission to Ayungin Shoal, the South Korean Embassy in Manila expressed concern as such actions may “raise tensions in the waters.”
All these show a growing convergence of interests between the two countries as they prepare to mark the 75th anniversary of their official relations next year.
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Lucio B. Pitlo III is a research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation. He is also a Taiwan fellow and visiting scholar at National Chengchi University Department of Diplomacy.
