How to read the Constitution and the laws
Many senators and readers ask, “How should the recently passed Maharlika Investment Fund (MIF) law (and other laws) be read and interpreted: According to the language used or according to the intents of the authors?” The question seems simple but there is no simple answer.
ANYWAY, RICARDO M. PILARES III, a young professor, Ateneo law valedictorian, and second placer in the 2006 bar exams, has just come out with a revised edition of his book, “Statutory Construction: Concept and Cases.” While intended for lawyers and law students, it is written in layman’s language (except when it quotes Supreme Court decisions). He said, and I agree, that the basic principle in statutory construction is to find the meaning intended by the framers of the law and to apply it in a given set of facts via verba legis or ratio legis. Under the verbal legis or the plain meaning rule, if a statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be accorded its literal meaning without using any other rule of interpretation. Lawmakers, to quote the Supreme Court, are “presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used such words advisedly, and to have expressed their intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute … the intent of the authors is gleaned from what is said, not from what they may have intended to say.” Interpretation is resorted to only when the literal meaning would be “impossible, absurd or would lead to injustice.” Example: In Republic v. Manalo (April 24, 2018), the Filipino wife was able to secure a valid divorce abroad, capacitating her foreigner husband to remarry. The issue was whether the Filipino wife could also remarry under Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, which in part provides: “ … where a divorce is … validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”
The Court held that the plain meaning of the words used in Article 26 (2) “only requires that there be a divorce decree validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who INITIATED (caps supplied) the [divorce] proceeding … It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding …” Even assuming arguendo “that there is ambiguity in the word ‘obtained,’ in such a case, the Court will construe Article 26 (2) in a manner consistent with the intent of the law, which is to prevent the absurd situation where the alien spouse is capacitated to remarry while the Filipino spouse is not allowed to remarry.”
WHICH BRINGS US TO THE SECOND RULE: Ratio legis et anima. Or “the reason of the law is the soul of the law.” This was explained rather circumlocutorily in League of Cities v. Comelec (Dec. 21, 2009) in this wise, “A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.” Please reread that quote from the Court and see whether you can figure it out.
The simpler quote is found in another decision (Naval v. Comelec, July 8, 2014): “Effect will be given the real intention even though contrary to the letter of the law.” Example: Salvacion v. Central Bank (Aug. 21, 1997) involved a Filipino minor who was detained and raped by an American tourist, who later escaped from detention and fled the country resulting in the indefinite delay of the criminal case. In anguish, the victim’s family instituted a separate civil action for damages and wanted to seize the dollar account of the perpetrator in a local bank.
The bank responded that, to encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits, a law (Republic Act No. 6426) exempts dollar deposits from attachments, garnishments, etc. The Court, however, observed that the law was enacted in 1983 when the economy was “in a shamble” and had to provide incentives to invite foreign currency deposits. While “the intention of the questioned law may have been good when enacted … [the law] failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality.” Accordingly, the Court ignored the letter of the law and ruled that RA 6426, was “INAPPLICABLE” to the case, and ordered the bank to “RELEASE to the [rape victim] the dollar deposits” of the perpetrator (caps in original).
BUT NOW, WE ARE BACK TO THE ORIGINAL QUESTION: How should the MIF law and other laws be read, via verba legis or ratio legis? Well, when I was an incumbent, I leaned on Article 10 of the Civil Code, “In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of the laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.” Thus, I decided on cases pursuant to my firm belief, after prayer and reflection, to achieve “right and justice.”
To conclude, I agree with both the Manalo and Salvacion decisions. Though they separately used the two opposing methods of interpretation, the Court nonetheless rendered “right and justice” in both cases.
