Did Marcos Jr. get Edca right?

Putrajaya—Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has found himself in hot water following seemingly over-placatory statements during a recent visit to Beijing. During his meeting with Xi Jinping, he described China’s paramount leader as a “visionary,” who had “not only changed the course of China but also given a ray of hope to the world and mankind…” What got his critics particularly worked up, however, were his remarks on the South China Sea disputes. Although Anwar took a generally tough stance on the maritime disputes, he suggested an openness to negotiation over energy exploration activities in disputed areas.

Immediately, former prime minister Muhyiddin Yassin lashed out at his successor, accusing Anwar of making “careless” remarks that “threaten the nation’s sovereignty,” since they concern areas that fall “within Malaysia’s territory and cannot be negotiated over or demanded by China.”

He beseeched Anwar to be “more stern” in defending the country’s sovereign rights. In fairness, Anwar tried to clarify his statements by maintaining that Malaysia’s territorial rights are nonnegotiable.

Dear reader: Let me provide some context so that we can appreciate what’s happening in the broader region, namely how our neighbors are beginning to resist bullying in the South China Sea.

Following the departure of Beijing-friendly Najib Razak in 2018, Malaysian leaders, beginning with Mahathir Mohammad, began taking an increasingly assertive stance in the South China Sea. In a bolt-from-the-blue move in late-2019, Malaysia filed an extended continental shelf claim to the United Nations in order to fortify its sovereign rights claims in southwestern portions of the South China Sea basin.

When Beijing complained, then Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah minced no words, dismissing China’s expansive claims as “ridiculous” and, taking inspiration from the Philippines’ arbitration ruling in 2016, even threatened to embark on international arbitration to defend his country’s lawful claims. Despite constant harassment by Chinese maritime forces, Malaysia’s Petronas, has been conducting energy exploration activities in areas that fall within Beijing’s nine-dash line claims. The move, which began in 2020, reflected a major shift in Malaysia’s historically acquiescent China policy.

Almost simultaneously, neighboring Indonesia also began to push back against China. In early-2020, President Joko Widodo visited the energy-rich Natuna islands, which overlap with the southernmost tip of Beijing’s vaguely defined nine-dash line, to openly challenge China’s intrusive presence in the area. The Indonesian leader was firm and uncompromising: “We have a district here, a regent, and a governor here. There are no more debates. De facto, de jure, Natuna is Indonesia.”

Jakarta also expanded its military presence in the area to make its uncompromising position clear. Similar to the Philippines, which named its exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea, Indonesia began to rename energy-rich waters off its northern islands as North Natuna Sea.

As for Vietnam, where anti-Beijing sentiments are a national pastime, compromise with China was always out of question, at least officially. In fact, the communist nation has not only bolstered its military and coast guard capabilities in adjacent waters, but it has also openly warned of potential “arbitration and litigation measures” against China over expansive disputes from the Paracel to the Spratly Islands.

But just when Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam began to resist China’s expansionism in adjacent waters, the Philippines was under the thumb of Rodrigo Duterte, who openly extolled the virtues of being “meek” in exchange for China’s “mercy.” The ex-mayor undermined the Philippines’ strategic position by constantly belittling the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling, our own armed forces’ capabilities, and the value of the Philippine-US military alliance.

Against this backdrop, President Marcos’ foreign policy thrust is a belated correction of Duterte’s misguided policies. But Mr. Marcos has to ensure that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (Edca) doesn’t end up deepening our dependence on an external power, reducing us to America’s “deputy sheriff” in Asean.

In short, Edca should be leveraged to enhance our own defensive capabilities and deter Beijing’s worst instincts, while avoiding overcommitment to America’s broader regional strategy, particularly over Taiwan. So far, it looks like the current leadership has not granted Americans access to our most prized bases in the north, namely in Mavulis and Fuga islands, while carefully calibrating Edca to ensure the pact focuses more on the enhancement of our own defensive capabilities vis-à-vis the West Philippine Sea.

rheydarian@inquirer.com.ph