On psychological incapacity and Dengvaxia

Absolute divorce between Filipinos is not allowed in our country (though allowed to Filipinos married to foreigners provided the divorce was valid in the place where it was obtained) However, in several decisions, the Supreme Court has liberalized its interpretation of “psychological incapacity” (PI) to liberate couples from the marital knot. To mark Valentine’s Day tomorrow, let me take up this subject.

AS POINTED OUT IN MY COLUMN ON APRIL 4, 2022, PI, as a ground to nullify a marriage, was copied by the Family Code from Canon Law. It had no prior constitutional, statutory or jurisprudential precedent. Understandably then, the earliest case on it, (Santos v. Court of Appeals, Jan. 4, 1995), relied on the canonical concept that PI “must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”

The second case (Republic v. Molina, Feb. 13, 1997) followed these characterizations and laid down eight guidelines sourced mostly from its invited amicus curiae, Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz, presiding judge of the Church’s National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. The guidelines provided in the main that the “root cause … must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision.”

Due to the alleged strictness of the guidelines, very few marriages were nullified. Thus, in subsequent cases, the Court modified the guidelines on a “case-to-case basis.” Tan-Andal v. Andal (May 11, 2021) revised these basic guidelines and held that expert evidence is not needed as even ordinary lay people can determine the presence of PI. After reading the full decision and the separate opinions, I opined in the said column that the newly installed proceedings to nullify marriages due to PI are strikingly similar to absolute divorce in foreign jurisdictions.

TO AVOID THE “CASE TO CASE” APPLICATION OF PI, the Court (in Macabata v. Macabata, April 6, 2022, reiterated in Republic v. Amata, Nov. 29, 2022) refreshingly clarified that of the eight guidelines laid down in the Molina decision, six were retained: The first, that the plaintiff has the burden to prove the existence of PI by “clear and convincing evidence” and that any doubt should be resolved in favor of marriage; the third that PI must be existing at the time of, or prior to, the celebration of the marriage; the fifth that PI “must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage;” the sixth that encompasses the “marital obligations” of the couple; the seventh that interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal should be accorded persuasive but not controlling effect; and the eighth that the trial court must order the prosecuting attorney and the solicitor general to appear as counsel for the state.

Abandoned were the second that requires medical experts to prove the existence of the “root cause” of PI; hence, even ordinary lay persons can testify to it; and the fourth that PI must be “medically or clinically permanent or incurable” was set aside in favor of what the Court calls “legal sense”—the “couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic” as to result only in the “inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage.”

THE RATIONALE FOR DISMISSING THE DENGVAXIA CASE was aptly summed up in elegant language in the first paragraphs of Abines v. Duque (Sept. 20, 2022, uploaded only on Feb. 6, 2023). Thus, (1) a petition for continuing mandamus may prosper only if it involves ecological rights or alleges any right regarding the protection of the environment, and not violations of the right to health; (2) even if it is treated as an ordinary petition for mandamus, it must still fail because the acts sought to be performed are not enjoined by law as a duty of the respondent government agencies given that they involve the exercise of discretion; (3) the petition violates the hierarchy of courts; (4) it involves questions of fact that are better attended to by the lower courts; and, (5) the reliefs sought have become academic since they have already been addressed by the executive branch while the petition pended.

Though appreciative of the deep research shown in the footnotes and the elegant language used in the decision, I believe the petition should have been resolved via a short and speedy unsigned resolution since no new doctrine was laid down. As it is, the Court may have crossed the constitutional mandate to decide cases within 24 months from the date of submission; this date is reckoned by the Constitution “upon the filing of the last pending brief or memorandum…”

The decision itself on page 7 states that “[i]n a February 18, 2020 Resolution, this Court required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, to which petitioners and respondents complied.” The decision also shows on page 4 that it was “Promulgated: September 20, 2022,” after more than 24 months. Were depth and elegance worth the risk of violating the 24-month rule?

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